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Abstract: This paper surveys the extant research in the field of ocean container transport. A 
wide range of issues is discussed including strategic planning, tactical planning and 
operations management issues, which are categorized into six research areas. The 
relationships between these research areas are discussed and the relevant literature is 
reviewed. Representative models are selected or modified to provide a flavour of their 
functions and application context, and used to explain current shipping practices. Future 
research opportunities bearing in mind the emerging phenomena in the field are discussed. 
The main purpose is to raise awareness and encourage more research into and application of 
operations management techniques and tools in container transport chains. 
 
Keywords: Container transport; competition and cooperation; pricing and contracting; 
shipping service design and scheduling; empty container repositioning and disruption 
management.  
 
1. Introduction 
With the globalization of the supply chain, intercontinental transport has become an essential 
component. Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit conducted a comprehensive research in 2009 
and found that the majority of world trade is carried by sea (75% by volume and 60% by 
value); and within the sea transport industry (including tanker, dry bulk, container, and 
general cargo), 52% of cargoes by value were carried by container ships. Since emerging in 
the 1960s, containerization has experienced a modest growth in the first three decades and 
then a rapid development in the last two decades. The container traffic has increased from 
nearly 85 million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent unit) in 1990 to 651 million TEUs in 2013 
with an annual growth rate of 9.3%. Containerization has greatly reduced the transport cost 
and contributed significantly to the global supply chain. The transport cost per unit of 
consumer goods (e.g. TV sets, vacuum cleaners, whisky, coffee, biscuits, and beer) accounts 
for approximately 1% of their shelf price only. Levinson (2006) discussed at great length the 
impact of containerization on the global economy.   
 
The key concept of containerization is standardization, which leads to the advantage of ease 
of handling in the entire transport chain. In other words, a container can be transported 
efficiently from origin to destination by different transport means (vessel, train, truck) 
without the need to reorganize/re-handle the content within. In that sense, containerization is 
naturally suited to integration in global supply chains. However, in reality container shipping 
 operations are still fragmented and the market environment is volatile. Operations 
management techniques and tools are seldom applied in container transport industries 
compared to other transport sectors such as air transport due to the special characteristics of 
sea transport. There are some typical differences between the air and the sea industry. First, in 
the air industry, many carriers have switched to electronic Airway Bills (AWB), yet for sea 
freight, the legal document—Bill of Lading (BOL)—is still printed on paper. Second, the air 
industry is a passenger network, hence revenue management is widely applied, yet very few 
sea liners have adopted such a tool. Third, in the air industry, service differentiation is 
important, yet in the sea industry, limited differentiation of services means that the 
competition is mainly cost-based.  Hence, forming alliances is very popular and important in 
the sea cargo liner industry. Fourth, in the air industry, no one company dominates because of 
the existence of air traffic rights; in the sea industry, there has been much consolidation and 
the world market is now dominated by a few major players. For example, the top 10 liners 
claim two-thirds whereas the top 20 liners own nine-tenths of the market. Hedging (e.g. on oil 
price) is very popular in the air industry, yet very few sea liners can afford it (a liner may end 
up bearing even higher risk if it adopts hedging but no other liner does). Finally, in the ocean 
container transport industry, slow steaming is adopted across the board, yet in the air industry, 
slow steaming is generally impractical because there is not much room for aircraft to slow 
down (Wang 2012). 
 
Container liner shipping is a capital-intensive industry with long investment lead times. As 
mentioned above, service differentiation is low in liner services, so the competition is mainly 
on a cost basis. Since the financial crisis of 2008, economic recession and declining trade 
demand have led to overcapacity in transport services. The situation is worsened by a 
fragmented market and carriers' relentless pursuit of economies of scale. Freight prices have 
grown extremely volatile in recent years. Lloyd’s List reported that freight rates slumped 40% 
within a week in November 2015. Dynamic operations and uncertain activities associated 
with long geographical distances in container shipping bring challenges to the quality of 
shipping services. Increasing concerns about the social and environmental impacts of 
shipping are also affecting shipping operations and performance. All these issues bring 
massive challenges to the container shipping industry.  
 
According to MergeGlobal, the value chain in the container shipping industry may be 
classified into five segments (with the estimated revenues in year 2006):  
1. Shipment routing and capacity procurement (US$32 billion);  
2. Container fleet and repositioning (US$8 billion);  
3. Vessel fleet and operations (US$102 billion);  
4. Terminal operations and container handling (US$35 billion);  
5. Inland transport vehicle and container handling (US$28 billion).   
 
With an emphasis on the first three segments (i.e. maritime container transportation 
problems), this paper aims to survey the extant research in the field of ocean container 
transport. This includes a wide range of strategic planning, tactical planning and operations 
management issues (see Figure 1.1). The strategic planning issues include: competition and 
cooperation between carriers, ports and terminals (Segments 1–4), and pricing and 
contracting (Segments 1–3). The tactical planning include: network design and routing 
(Segment 1 and 3), and ship scheduling and slow steaming (Segment 3). The operations 
management issues include: empty container repositioning (Segment 2), and safety and 
disruption management (Segment 3). It should be noted that empty container repositioning 
 and safety and disruption management include tactical planning tasks. The reason we classify 
them as operational level is that: empty container repositioning usually has a lower priority 
than laden container movements and the decisions are often decentralized; safety and 
disruption management intends to cope with unexpected but occasional (or one-off) events 
that often require real-time actions. The double arrows in Figure 1.1 indicate that the planning 
issues may influence each other and are sometimes considered jointly. Please note also that 
according to a report by Notteboom (2006), port congestion contributed to 65.5% of the 
containership’s schedule unreliability. Clearly, improving the efficiency of port operations is 
critical in the maritime container transportation. Nevertheless, a plethora of studies has 
existed on container port/terminal productivity. Readers may refer to the survey papers such 
as Steenken et al. (2004); Stahlbock and Voss (2008); Bierwirth and Meisel (2010); and Kim 
and Lee (2015) for detailed discussions in this area.  Due to the length limit, we will not 
cover this issue in our paper.    
 
In all six research areas, previous survey papers and representative literature are reviewed. 
Representative models with specifics will be introduced to provide a flavour of their function 
and application context. In each identified research area, future research opportunities bearing 
in mind the emerging phenomena in the current practice will be discussed. It should be noted 
that it is not our intention to include all relevant literature in this paper due to its wide 
coverage. Instead, our focus is to provide a broad picture of various maritime container 
transportation problems and their relationships by explaining the key planning issues, 
introducing representative models, and identifying further research opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Six planning issues in maritime container transportation 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2–3, we focus on two strategic 
planning issues that concern the relationship management between channel members, i.e. (i) 
competition and cooperation between ocean carriers, ports and terminals; (ii) pricing and 
contracting. In Sections 4-5, we focus on two tactical planning issues from ocean carrier’s 
organizational perspective, i.e. (i) network design and routing; (ii) ship scheduling and slow 
steaming. In Sections 6-7, we focus on two operations management issues, i.e. (i) empty 
container management; (ii) safety and disruption management. In each of Sections 2-7, we 
explain the research context and the linkage between planning issues, and review the relevant 
literature for each issue. Representative models are introduced to complement the general 
literature review and explain the application of some operations management methods. The 
research opportunities are then identified to stimulate further study. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn in Section 8.  
 
• Competition and cooperation 
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 2. Competition and cooperation between carriers, ports and terminals 
Ocean carrier and container port are two key players in global container supply chain. There 
exist both competition and cooperation between carriers, ports and terminals horizontally and 
vertically. A number of papers have provided overviews on these issues, e.g. competition and 
cooperation between ocean carriers (Heaver et al. 2000; Panayides and Cullinane 2002; 
Notteboom 2004; Cariou 2008; Alexandrou et al. 2014; Caschili et al. 2014); cooperation 
between ocean carriers and other members in vertical channel (Heaver et al. 2000; Panayides 
and Cullinane 2002; Notteboom 2004; Cariou 2008; Fremont 2009); competition and 
cooperation between ports/terminals (Heaver et al. 2001; Song 2003; Notteboom 2004; 
Mclaughlin and Fearon 2013; Notteboom and de Langen 2015; Lee and Lam 2015). 
 
In this section, we first address the competition and cooperation issues mainly from carrier 
perspective; then address the competition and cooperation issues from port and terminal 
perspective. A representative model is then presented. Finally, the research opportunities will 
be discussed.  
 
2.1 Carrier competition and cooperation 
Ocean carriers invest heavily on ship and container assets to provide maritime transport 
services to shippers. Due to the capital-intensive nature to provide regular shipping services, 
horizontal competition between shipping lines is fierce. In the last twenty years, cooperation 
between shipping lines has been popular and co-exists with competition in container shipping.  
 
The competitive advantages that shipping lines are constantly seeking may be broadly 
classified into two categories: operational efficiency and service effectiveness. The former 
emphasizes cost reduction and asset utilisation/efficiency. Typical examples of strategies and 
practices include: horizontal integration by forming a strategic alliance adopting slow 
steaming, deploying larger vessels for economies of scale, deploying more efficient vessels 
(e.g. Maersk Line’s triple-E vessels), and sharing resources to improve utilisation. Service 
effectiveness, on the other hand, emphasizes service differentiation and quality of service. 
Typical examples of service effectiveness include: vertical integration with other stakeholders 
or expanding to logistics services, more frequent and flexible service (e.g. Maersk’s daily 
service), service reliability, more flexible closing time, wider shipping network and coverage.  
Note that different from the air industry, the ocean industry is demand in-elastic and service 
differentiation is limited. Thus, nowadays, the competition is mainly on the cost. This is the 
main reason why alliances are so popular as they provide economies of scale and cut 
operational costs. 
 
Shipping lines cooperate mainly to reduce cost by enhancing the utilisation of facilities, to 
improve the service frequency and region of coverage by expanding capacity, to rationalise 
the shipping service network, and to share management resources. Notteboom (2004) 
provided an overview of the challenges facing port and ocean carriers in the competitive 
environment. Based on empirical evidence, he analysed the different paths that shipping lines 
might take including trade agreements, operating agreements (e.g. vessel sharing agreements, 
slot chartering agreements, consortia and strategic alliances) and mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Cooperation in liner shipping takes various forms, e.g. slot purchase agreement, slot 
exchange agreement, vessel sharing, equity-sharing joint venture, and cargo sharing. The 
most prominent type of alliance is often referred to as strategic or global alliances, which aim 
 at jointly operating containerships over specific routes. They cooperate on decisions related 
to ship type/size, number of ships, port selection and sequence, and ship sailing schedule. The 
cooperation among members of a strategic alliance is often limited to ship operations without 
involving marketing, pricing, revenue pooling, profit/loss sharing, and joint management and 
executive functions (Panayides and Wiedmer 2011). 
 
Heaver et al. (2000) presented an overview of different cooperation agreements including 
alliances and mergers among shipping lines, conferences, vertical integration of shipping 
lines with terminal operators or inland transport companies. The main focus was on the 
competitive position of the ports in the new market structure. Panayides and Cullinane (2002) 
addressed the issue of competitive advantage in liner shipping by focusing on the themes 
such as vertical integration, strategic alliances, mergers and acquisition, and shipper 
relationships. They pointed out the need for empirical investigation of the strategy-
performance relationship. Panayides (2003) conducted an empirical research and found the 
positive relationship between pursuing competitive strategies and company performance in 
ship management (e.g. by achieving economies of scale and offering a wider range of 
services). Cariou (2008) provided an overview of horizontal integration, vertical integration 
and investment of mega-vessels in liner shipping sector for the period from 1990 to 2005. 
Fremont (2009) discussed various levels of vertical integration that a shipping line can 
achieve, e.g. a shipping line can take on the functions of a shipping agent and a terminal 
operator. This implies that the shipping line no longer has to depend on an external agent who 
may also provide services to a competitor and ensure more efficient handling at container 
terminals. The shipping line can go further to integrate with inland transport operators, freight 
forwarders and/or logistics service providers, which would enable it to offer extended or even 
door-to-door services. Alexandrou et al. (2014) surveyed the shipping mergers and 
acquisitions from 1984 to 2011 and analysed the gains that the shareholders of both acquirers 
and targets realized. Caschili et al. (2014) performed a network analysis to examine how 
shipping companies integrate and coordinate their activities. It was confirmed that the main 
purpose of the cooperation is to reduce costs, compete against larger carriers, or increase their 
local and specialized market penetration. 
 
The scale and scope of liner shipping alliances is quite unique compared to other transport 
industry sectors, and play a central role in the operations and long-term viability of liner 
shipping companies. With the announcement of the 2M Alliance (Maersk and MSC) and the 
Ocean Three Alliance (CMA CGM, CSCL, UASC) in 2014, every shipping line in the top 10 
in the world is a member of one of the global alliances. According to the data from 
Alphaliner in November  2015, the CKYHE Alliance (Cosco, K-Line, Yang Ming, Hanjin, 
Evergreen) occupies 16.46% of the market; the G6 Alliance (Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, OOCL, 
APL, MOL and HMM) occupies  17.14%; the 2M Alliance occupies 27.94%; and the Ocean 
Three Alliance occupies 14.65%. These four alliances combined account for nearly 80% of 
the global container carrying capacity. Recently, there have been a number of major mergers 
occurred or planned, e.g. the merger of Cosco and CSCL in late 2015, the acquisition of NOL 
(the parent of APL) by CMA CGM in the summer 2016, the potential merger of Hapag-Lloyd 
and UASC revealed in April 2016. These mergers and acquisitions have triggered the re-
organization of existing shipping alliances. For example, a new alliance, named as “Ocean 
Alliance” was announced on 20th April 2016, which consists of four ocean carriers: CMA 
CGM, COSCO Container Lines, Evergreen and OOCL, which are from three different 
existing alliances. The Ocean Alliance will become operational from April 2017 subject to 
regulatory approval. Its market share will be nearly 35% on Asia-Europe service and 38.9% 
 on Asia-North America routes, making it the largest on those routes. Because three existing 
alliances, Ocean Three, CKYHE, and G6 are to lose their key members, this will probably 
bring to an end to these three alliances in 2017. According to Alphaliner, a potential scenario 
is that the eight container carriers left out of the two major alliances, the 2M and Ocean 
Alliance, could team up to form a new mega-alliance. This potential new alliance would 
consist of Hapag-Lloyd (G6), UASC (Ocean Three), Yang Ming (CKYHE), NYK (G6), K 
Line (CKYHE) and MOL (G6), but may omit two South Korean ocean carriers, Hanjin 
(CKYHE) and HMM (G6), because they are experiencing serious financial problems.  
 
Huang and Yoshida (2013) summarised the comments of several executives on the formation 
of liner shipping alliances during the recent economy recession as follows: (i) the market is 
turning into an oligopoly because of frequent mergers and acquisitions, lower market 
investment, and low return on equity; (ii) alliances create high barriers of entry; (iii) alliances 
are growing in scale and scope, and so cut-throat competition is inevitable; and (iv) service 
quality and reliability will be the key issues for alliances in the future. 
 
From the modelling perspective, there are relatively limited number of studies on competition 
and cooperation between shipping lines. Lei et al. (2008) presented mixed integer 
programming models to evaluate non-collaborative, slot-sharing and total-sharing container-
vessel policies. They indicated that the advantage of collaborative planning cannot be fully 
exploited without partner carriers' full commitment to share the demand and the resource. 
 
Agarwal and Ergun (2008b) considered the container shipment assignment problem in a 
shipping alliance network, in which individual shipping lines own capacity on the arcs of the 
network and share this capacity to deliver shipments. Using cooperative game theory and the 
inverse optimization technique, they presented a mechanism of regulating interaction among 
the shipping lines in the alliance by computing capacity exchange costs, which motivates 
individual shipping lines to move towards the collaborative solution. Agarwal and Ergun 
(2010) extended the above model to address the alliance formation among shipping lines 
covering both tactical issues (such as shipping network design) and operational issues (such 
as capacity allocation among shipping lines in the alliance). Zheng et al. (2015a) further 
extended the above work to the network design and capacity exchange problem for liner 
alliances with fixed and variable container demands. They assumed that each shipping line 
only operates its own shipping routes with its own ships, and capacity exchange costs are 
determined for shared shipping routes (instead of for each link of the network as in Agarwal 
and Ergun (2008b; 2010)). Alvarez-SanJaime et al. (2013) modelled the competition between 
a road transport firm and two shipping lines, and investigated the impact of the horizontal 
integration of two shipping lines on their profitability and the social welfare.  
 
Within a strategic alliance, the alliance member companies are still regarded as competitors. 
This is due to the fact that alliance members normally only cooperate at the operational level, 
e.g. slot exchange, vessel sharing, service route rationalisation. They are competing against 
each other in terms of marketing and sales, pricing, and organisation. Song and Panayides 
(2002) pointed out that alliance members may indeed pursue their own self-interest at the 
expense of the alliance and other members if opportunities arise.   
 
Methodologically, Polak et al. (2004) proposed multi-agent-based simulation to model the 
competition between shipping lines, in which shipping lines compete for customer demand in 
a bottom-up bidding process. Song and Panayides (2002) argued that cooperative game 
 theory is an applicable approach for modelling inter-organisational behaviour of shipping 
lines in a strategic alliance for two reasons: (i) it considers the underlying motivations for the 
formation of the strategic alliance; (ii) it aims to optimise the joint business objectives of all 
partners. However, the second reason may not always hold since alliance members may not 
always have a common goal and may act independently. Gelareh et al. (2010) presented a 
mixed-integer programming formulation and a Lagrangian method combined with a primal 
heuristic to address the hub-and-spoke network design problem, in which the competition 
between a newcomer liner service provider and an existing dominating operator is considered. 
Wang et al. (2014a) presented non-cooperative models to analyse the competition between 
two shipping lines in a new emerging container shipping market. The shipping lines’ 
decisions include the freight rate, service frequency and ship capacity. The market share of 
each shipping line is determined by the logit-based discrete choice model.  
 
 
2.2 Port and terminal competition and cooperation 
Port authority traditionally has three types of functions: landlord, regulator and operator. Its 
job is to administrate and manage port infrastructure, and coordinate and control the activities 
of the different operators present in the port (Verhoeven 2010). With the socioeconomic 
changes in the port landscape in recent years, port authority is also developing a community 
manager function that aims to solve collective action problems in and outside the port area, 
such as hinterland bottlenecks, training and education, marketing and promotion, innovation 
and internationalisation (Verhoeven 2010). Port authority outsources the cargo-handling 
activities to private operators, i.e. terminal operators, who are responsible for providing 
expensive handling equipment (such as quay cranes, yard cranes) and other resources to 
handle ships and containers.  
 
Heaver et al. (2001) discussed strategic measures in terms of the cooperation and competition 
relationships between port authorities and terminal operators, and between terminal operators 
within a port. Song (2003) proposed a concept ‘co-opetition’, the combination of competition 
and co-operation, to explain the relationships of the container ports in Hong Kong and South 
China. Notteboom (2004) discussed the challenges faced by container terminal operators, e.g. 
competition from new entrants including carrier, railway companies, logistics companies and 
investment groups. Based on the empirical data, he showed the emergence of international 
terminal networks and the integration along the supply chain. Mclaughlin and Fearon (2013) 
considered cooperation and competition through a new conceptual cooperation/competition 
matrix and evaluated the response strategies of ports to the changing maritime competitive 
dynamics with their competing ports. Notteboom and de Langen (2015) discussed container 
port competition in Europe at different levels. At the intra-port competition level, operators 
compete for cargo handling, and towage and bunkering business. At the level of inter-port 
competition within the same region, adjacent seaports compete for the same hinterland cargo 
flows. Port authorities focus on offering the best basic infrastructure and IT facilities, the best 
logistics facilities and the lowest port user costs, whereas terminal operators focus on price, 
handling time and productivity. Government policies can also have an impact on the 
conditions and level of competition among subgroups of ports. At the level of inter-port 
competition between different regions, hub ports compete for transhipments in hub-feeder 
relations. Lee and Lam (2015) evaluated the competitiveness of four major Asia container 
ports: Busan, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Singapore. They measured port competitiveness by 
cross-sectional, longitudinal and horizontal aspects including service quality, ICT, 
 community environmental impact, port cluster, maritime cluster, logistics hub, inland and 
waterside. 
 
From the methodological perspective, the literature on port competition may be classified 
into two groups. The first group employs empirically based approaches (such as case study, 
survey, data envelopment analysis, stochastic frontier analysis, analytical hierarchy process, 
structural equation models) to define a conceptual framework of port competition and 
competitiveness, measure port efficiency and performance, and identify key competitive 
factors. The second group develops mathematical models such as game-theoretic models to 
examine port competition.  
 
Many studies on port competition were empirically based (Notteboom and Yap 2012). This is 
understandable since many factors could affect the strategic and operational decisions at ports. 
Some factors are qualitative in nature, e.g. reputation, skill and knowledge of employees, 
understanding customer needs, ease of communication, political stability, social stability, and 
availability of other supporting services. Other factors are quantifiable, e.g. terminal handling 
charges, port dues, pilotage and towage, storage costs, reliability, physical accessibility of 
hinterland, maritime access, terminal productivity, transit time for shipment, port 
maintenance charges, connectivity to other ports, and accident rate (Yap and Lam 2004). 
Some institutes are trying to rate terminal operators (like rating hotels) based on key 
performance indicators of efficiency, but none has succeeded so far because too many 
uncontrollable factors exist that are not easy to evaluate.  A much broader scale for rating 
global logistics performance for more than one hundred countries has been developed by 
World Bank in 2007, 2010, 2012 and 2014, based on the following criteria: customs, 
infrastructure, international shipment, logistics quality and competence, tracking and tracing, 
and timeliness (World Bank 2014). 
 
In the last decade, a number of game-theoretic models have been developed to address port 
competition in a quantitative way. According to the geographic distance between the players, 
port competition can be classified into three levels: intra-port competition between terminal 
operators at the same port (e.g. Saeed and Larsen 2010); inter-port competition between 
operators at neighbouring container ports (Song 2002; De Borger et al. 2008; Li and Oh 2010; 
Wang et al. 2012; Song et al. 2016); and inter-port competition between operators at different 
geographical areas (Bae et al. 2013; Wan et al. 2013). At the third level, port authorities and 
port policymakers are often involved either explicitly or implicitly. Their role is to offer good 
infrastructure in and around the port so that the port can compete with other ports in the 
region. Although most of these game theoretical models are relatively simple and based on 
rather restrictive assumptions, they represent a promising research stream since they are able 
to capture the nature of port competition in the container shipping industry.  
 
Apart from the competition between ports, the cooperation between ports has also been 
discussed in the literature (e.g. Heaver et al. 2001; Song 2003; Mclaughlin and Fearon 2013; 
Asgari et al. 2013). Mclaughlin and Fearon (2013) argued that direct competition and 
preserving traditional inter-port rivalries is not a sustainable strategic response to globalized 
competitive dynamics, and increasing collaboration or partnerships is the way forward. 
However, collaboration between ports is seldom formalized in practice.  
 
 2.3 A game model of competition involving ports and carriers 
In the following, we introduce a non-cooperative game-theoretical model based on Bae et al. 
(2013), which aims to examine port competition for transhipment containers in a duopoly 
market but involving multiple shipping lines. Consider a scenario with two transhipment 
ports competing for port calls from a number of shipping lines. Each port has to make pricing 
decisions on container handling (e.g. terminal handling charge), whereas each shipping line 
has to make decisions on transhipment port calls split over two ports. The following notation 
is used:  
 
p: the index of two transhipment ports, p=1,2; 
j: the index of shipping lines that call at both ports; 
fjp: the gateway containers that are imported and exported at the port p by liner j; 
gj: the total transhipment containers by liner j at the two ports; 
pj: the shipping line j’s price (revenue) per container; 
Kp: the port p’s effective maximum capacity; 
ap: a positive coefficient related to port congestion cost; 
l
jc : the shipping line j’s unit operating cost; 
cp: the port p’s operation cost per unit; 
mp: the port p’s capacity investment cost per unit; 
qjp: the decision variable indicating the fraction of transhipment port calls that shipping 
line j makes at port p such that 0 < qjp < 1 and qj2 = 1 – qj1; 
wp: the decision variable indicating the container handling price at port p; 
 
It is assumed that the transhipment container demand of each shipping line at one port is 
proportional to its fraction of transhipment port calls at the corresponding port in the given 
period of time. The gateway containers are not affected by the port call split decisions. Thus, 
the total number of containers that shipping line j handles at port p is denoted by Fjp and 
given by  
Fjp = fjp + gj ⋅ qjp, for p=1,2; 
 
Port congestion is a very important factor for shipping lines when deciding how to split 
transhipment port calls over two ports. The following quadratic function describes the port 
congestion cost per unit (which can be regarded as container delay cost due to port 
congestion): 
Gp = ap⋅ (Fp / Kp)
2, for p=1,2 
 
where ap is a positive parameter, Kp represents port p’s effective maximum capacity, Fp = 
∑jFjp, and Fp ≤ Kp. It is easy to see that the congestion cost is increasing in the number of port 
calls, and decreasing in port capacity. 
 
In a non-cooperative game, each player makes decisions independently. To apply the non-
cooperative game theory, we define the profit functions for all players. Shipping lines’ profit 
functions are given (for j=1,2,…,N) as follows:  
 ljπ  = ∑p (pj – 
l
jc  – wp – Gp) ⋅ Fjp  
s.t. 
0 < qj1, qj2 < 1 
qj2 = 1 – qj1  
Fp ≤ Kp, for p=1,2  
 
 
where wp represents the container handling cost paid to the port (i.e. port price per unit). Ports’ 
profit functions (for p=1,2) are given as follows:  
 πp = (wp – cp) ⋅ Fp – mp ⋅ Kp, for p=1,2 
 
The non-cooperative game problem can then be formulated as a two-stage problem. At the 
first stage, each port makes port pricing decisions (wp) to maximize its profit. At the second 
stage, each shipping line makes its port call decision (qjp) to maximize its own profit by 
observing each port’s capacities, prices, and transhipment levels.  
 
To solve the problem, the backwards induction approach is used. For the second stage, the 
sub-game Nash equilibrium can be obtained. The port call decision variables can be 
represented as a function of port capacities, prices, and transhipment levels. For the first stage, 
by utilizing the port call decisions obtained at the second stage, the Nash equilibrium port 
prices can be derived. This then yields the shipping lines’ port call decisions.  
 
2.4 Research opportunities 
We suggest the following areas for further research:  
• Although a few studies have applied the non-cooperative game approach to model 
port competition, they are limited to specific contexts. The empirical research has 
shown a long list of factors that affect the competitiveness of a port or terminal 
(Notteboom and Yap 2012). Therefore, more sophisticated models should be 
developed so that the main factors can be appropriately incorporated. 
• The concept of port co-opetition has existed for a decade, yet neither the empirical 
research nor the modelling research has given adequate attention to it (in particular to 
formalised cooperation like liner alliances). In addition, seaports are no longer 
regarded as isolated nodes but rather as crucial and integrated links within global 
value chains of primary and support activities. Thus, port competition may be 
extended to intermodal supply chain competition, or port-cluster competition (e.g. a 
hub port with a set of feeder ports). 
• Horizontal integration: As pointed out by Caschili et al. (2014), although cooperative 
agreements and alliances are main trends in the shipping industry, scant analyses and 
models have been performed on this topical industrial strategy. In the past, the largest 
two shipping lines, Maersk and MSC did not participate in an alliance as they can 
achieve economies of scale individually with their large ship fleets. With the 
formation of the 2M Alliance and the Ocean Three Alliance in 2014, every shipping 
lines in the top ten in the world is a member of one of the global alliances. Note that 
members in a strategic alliance are independent in some business operations, and 
cooperative in other operations. There are three types of competition between in liner 
shipping industry: (i) competition between strategic alliances; (ii) competition 
between individual shipping lines in different alliances; (iii) competition and 
cooperation between individual shipping lines within the same alliance. There is a 
need of more operations management studies in the above three aspects. With the 
merger of Cosco and CSCL, and the acquisition of APL by CMA CGM, it is 
interesting to see how the existing shipping alliances would be re-organized and to 
what degree individual shipping lines could be affected. In addition, as the scale of 
strategic alliances in liner shipping reached an unprecedented level, shippers have 
raised some concerns on quality of service and freight rates since the consolidation of 
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the world’s top 20 shipping lines into super alliances. Therefore, the impact of such 
large scale of alliances on shippers is worth investigating. 
 
• Vertical integration: there has been clear evidence that some shipping lines are 
pursuing vertical integration to achieve integrated intermodal supply chain 
management. For example, a shipping line can take on the functions of a shipping 
agent and a terminal operator. This implies that the shipping line no longer has to 
depend on an external agent who may also provide services to a competitor and 
ensure more efficient handling at container terminals. The shipping line can go further 
to integrate with inland transport operators, freight forwarders and/or logistics service 
providers, which would enable it to offer extended or even door-to-door services 
(Fremont 2009). Therefore, it is important to explore the enhanced scope of logistics 
activities and the management issues under vertical integration, e.g. how to achieve 
optimal intermodal container transport on a global scale. 
• Under either vertical or horizontal integration of global container supply chains, the 
question of how to incorporate operational-level uncertainties such as random 
demands and port congestion into tactical/strategic planning problems requires more 
research. 
• The Container World project (Polak et al. 2004) proposed a multi-agent-based 
simulation approach and the concept of the complex adaptive system to model the 
global intermodal container supply chain systems. This approach is probably 
appropriate for the current container shipping practice given the fragmented nature of 
the industry. However, the main challenges remain largely unanswered: (i) how to 
appropriately capture individual agents’ autonomous and coordination behaviours; (ii) 
how to collect consistent data for the global shipping networks and inland transport 
networks; (iii) how to forecast global trade demands; and (iv) how to balance between 
the complexity of the model and computational complexity.  
 
3. Pricing and contracting 
Container transport is a global activity involving multiple players. Managing these 
relationships is of strategic importance. One aspect of relationship management is pricing and 
contracting among players. Pricing is closely related to competition issue, whereas 
contracting is related to cooperation issue in the previous section. Fransoo and Lee (2013) has 
one section covering this issue. However, we did not find any specific survey paper that 
dedicated on the container shipping pricing and contracting. In this section, we will discuss 
the trade agreement between consignor and consignee, and the contracts among service 
providers, or between user and provider; describe the pricing problem; review the relevant 
literature; present a specific model on pricing and contracting, and then point out future 
research opportunities.  
 
The complexity of container shipping does not arise only from border crossing issues and 
multimodal transport over long distances, but also from the fact that a large number of parties 
are involved, each with their own objectives. For example, the following players may be 
involved in a container shipping supply chain: a consignor, a consignee, an ocean carrier, 
freight forwarders, inland carriers, banks, legal experts, insurance brokers, customs, 
port/terminal operators, and inland depot operators. They can be roughly divided into service 
users and service providers. The consignor and the consignee are service users, and all other 
players are service providers.   
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A series of buy or sell transactions are conducted among the players, who must deal with the 
pricing and/or contracting issues. Unlike air freight, where rates are centrally negotiated and 
published by trade bodies, ocean freight has to be negotiated individually with ocean carriers 
in two forms: a contract rate agreed for a fixed period of time (normally a year), and a spot 
market rate at the time of booking. In the following, we will address the contracting and 
pricing issues in a typical container shipping supply chain consisting of a consignor, a 
consignee, an ocean carrier, a freight forwarder, and a terminal operator.  
 
3.1 Trade agreement between consignor and consignee 
International trade is generated by the buy-sell agreement between the consignor (seller) and 
consignee (buyer) and drives the demand for international logistics including maritime 
shipping. The contract between consignor and consignee must cover the terms of sale and 
terms of payment. The former specifies who is responsible for arranging the physical 
movement of the goods (and for paying the incurred charge), and when and where the legal 
title to the goods is transferred to the consignee. The latter specifies when and how the 
payment is to be made. Clearly, these terms must be appropriately coordinated to ensure that 
the buyer will receive the right goods and the seller will receive the right payment. The 
delivery terms (called Incoterms) used in international trade were standardised by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1936. The most recent version was released in 
2010 (ICC, 2010), which consists of 11 Incoterms ranging from EXW (ex works, i.e. handing 
over the ownership of the goods at the seller’s premise) to DDP (delivery duty paid, i.e. 
handing over the ownership at the buyer’s premise). Several Incoterms have been specifically 
designed for maritime transport, and all of them are in use today depending on the agreement 
between the seller and the buyer. However, the most commonly used Incoterms are FOB 
(free on board) and CIF (cost, insurance and freight). Under FOB (CIF), the seller is 
responsible for the delivery of goods on board a vessel (to a specified port), and the buyer is 
responsible for the rest of the delivery journey. Fransoo and Lee (2013) pointed out that there 
is little academic work (either theoretical or empirical) on decision making related to 
Incoterms. Recently, Del Rosal (2015) presented an econometric model to examine the 
relationship between the use of delivery terms and several factors such as the weight/value 
ratio, distance, and GDP per capita, based on empirical data on Spanish seaborne export and 
import operations in 2011. 
 
3.2 Contract among service providers, or between user and provider 
The shipper is the owner of the transported cargo. Depending on the terms of sale, either the 
seller or the buyer may be the shipper who negotiates with the ocean carrier for the seaborne 
transportation. The contract between shipper and ocean carrier is termed a bill of lading. 
Apart from serving as a contract of carriage, a bill of lading also serves as a document of title 
to the goods and a receipt for goods. In practice, ocean carriers often have long-term 
contracts (one year or more) with major shippers or large freight forwarders (i.e. non-vessel 
operating common carriers or NVOCCs), which can provide them with regular large volumes 
of full containers. For example, MSC and BMW have long-term shipment contracts at 
Antwerp port (Fremont, 2009). Signing these long-term contracts also helps shipping lines 
better control their container stocks as the origins and destinations of containers are fixed. 
However, the flat freight rate agreed in such long-term contracts could fall well below the 
spot market price because of the volatile freight rate market. For example, Maersk Line 
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signed a long-term contract with Argos (a large retailer in the UK) at the agreed rate of 
US$930 per container, and later on unilaterally imposed an increased rate of $2,730 per 
container in response to high spot market price. Maersk Line eventually forked out US$14 
million to settle the dispute with Argos according to Lloyd’s List. On the other hand, when 
the spot freight rate tumbled, Maersk Line mentioned that some of its shippers may rip up the 
signed long-term contracts and go for the spot market (Brett 2014b). However, no specific 
cases have been reported on whether a penalty is imposed if shippers display opportunistic 
behaviour and violate the long-term contracts.  
 
Container terminals provide services to ocean carriers such as berthing vessels, loading and 
unloading, container storage, and refuelling. There are formal contracts between ocean 
carriers and terminal operators. The contract and pricing may be highly related to the types of 
container terminals. According to their ownership, container terminals may be classified into 
five types: public or state-run terminals, carrier-leased dedicated terminals, operator-built and 
operated terminals, carrier-built and operated terminals, and terminals that are joint ventures 
between the carriers and terminal operators. For example, public or state-run terminals often 
operate on a first-come-first-served basis, which means the port service tariff is the same for 
all carriers, and normally no penalty is imposed for delays caused either by the carrier or the 
terminal. On the other hand, dedicated container terminals act as strategic hubs for the carrier, 
which may be used by the associated carrier solely or with priority. Maersk Line and APM 
Terminals reportedly entered into a formal agreement in 2013, which provide Maersk Line 
with dedicated capacity at certain key container terminals to ensure service efficiency (Brett 
2014a). As mentioned in Fransoo and Lee (2013), though the consignor (consignee) has an 
operational relationship with the terminal operator as they need to deliver (pick up) 
containers to (from) the terminal, they do not in contractual relationships with the terminal 
operator.    
 
Inland carriers such as rail operators or road hauliers may sign long-term contracts with ocean 
carriers. The development of intermodality and door-to-door service (i.e. carrier haulage) has 
meant that shipping lines could either extend their service to hinterland transport or 
subcontract to inland carriers (e.g. Maersk Line has a multi-year contract with the UK rail 
operator, Freightliner). Carrier haulage is popular in North America and the UK, but less 
popular in Europe and Asia (Fremont 2009). The proportion of inland transport that is 
directly controlled by shipping lines is estimated to be 30% (Notteboom, 2004). The 
organisational structure may affect the contractual relationship between ocean carrier and 
inland carrier. When a shipping line subsidiary and a logistics subsidiary both belong to a 
larger conglomerate group, the two subsidiaries can perform their activities independently 
with no direct association between them, e.g. Maersk Line and Maersk Logistics are 
subsidiaries of AP Moller-Maersk Group; APL and APL Logistics are subsidiaries of the 
NOL Group. However, shipping lines or their parent companies must often make a choice 
between reinforcing their core business activity and developing other activities along the 
transport chain to offer value-added services to their clients. For example, in early 2015 the 
NOL Group sold APL Logistics to Kintetsu for US$1.2 billion in order to deploy fresh capital 
in the container shipping division (Inagaki and Grant 2015). 
 
The main activities that a freight forwarder undertakes are freight grouping/degrouping 
operations, documentation, and customs clearance. Large freight forwarders also play a role 
in managing flows of goods before and after the production processes including inland 
transportation of containers. Europe’s top four ocean freight forwarders are: Kuehne+Nagel, 
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Deutsche Post DHL, DB Schenker, and Panalpina. These large freight forwarders purchase 
slots from ocean carriers in advance in large quantities, and then act as NVOCCs to provide 
seaborne transport services to shippers. In that sense, the price between ocean carriers and 
NVOCCs can be regarded as a wholesale price, whereas the price between NVOCC and 
shippers can be regarded as a retail price.  
 
As mentioned above, in the current practice, the carrier may sign a contract with the shipper 
stating a ﬁxed price per container for the whole year or sell the slots in the spot market just 
before the shipping.  The former case benefits the carrier by allowing it to lock in the market 
share and it is also good for capacity planning. Nevertheless, many executives representing 
shippers are reluctant to sign fixed-price contracts to avoid having to bear the responsibility 
when the spot market price drops below than the contract price. Lee and Tang, et al., (2015) 
addressed the issue by investigating whether carriers should bear some of the “price risk” by 
offering a “fractional” price matching contract in which the shipper pays a constant 
contracted freight rate in advance. If the realised spot price is below the regular price, the 
carrier will refund the shipper a “fraction” of the difference between the regular price and the 
realised spot price. They show that the carrier can generate a higher demand from the 
shippers for using the fractional price matching contract. Also, the carrier will not incur any 
revenue loss by optimally adopting this scheme, i.e. the optimal fractional price matching 
contract is “revenue neutral.”   
 
3.3 Shipping pricing in practice 
Container shipping pricing has been a long debated topic. Historically, liner conferences have 
been used as a device by ocean carriers to agree a set of tariffs, and terms and conditions of 
carriage in certain trade routes. Since October 2008, liner conference activities and price 
fixing are no longer permitted on routes to and from Europe. However, liner conferences in 
other parts of the world are still acceptable, e.g. Transpacific Stabilisation Agreement (TSA) 
and the Canada Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (CTSA). 
 
In the recent years, shipping lines have been using general rate increase (GRI) as a regular 
mechanism to increase freight rates. GRI refers to the average amount by which an ocean 
carrier will add to the current base freight rate. However, shipping lines were suspected to 
collusion on the freight rate using GRI as “pricing signals” to competitors intended to raise 
freight rates. In February 2016, Europe competition regulator announced a deal with 15 major 
shipping lines to end the public GRI announcements on European routes. The GRI 
announcement will be replaced by the total price announcement, which specifies the 
maximum prices for the announced period of validity, but carriers will remain free to offer 
prices below the announced maximum price. However, it is unclear when the new pricing 
rules will be implemented. Table 3.1 shows the regulatory rules concerning carrier pricing 
around the world. 
 
Table 3.1 Regulatory rules concerning carrier pricing around the world (Source: Drewry 2016) 
 Asia, Africa, Latin 
America and Oceania 
(except European 
route) 
US (except 
European 
route) 
Europe 
now 
Europe post-
GRI ban 
Liner 
conference 
Allowed Allowed (but 
few operate) 
Not since 
Oct. 2008 
Not 
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Discussion 
agreements 
Allowed Allowed Not Not 
GRI 
announcements 
by carriers 
Allowed Allowed Allowed 15 carriers to 
stop publishing 
GRIs  
 
Drewry (2016) summarized the main changes and no changes to shippers under the new 
pricing rules on European routes: (i) The post-GRI pricing rules will affect spot rates only 
and not affect contract rates; (ii) Individual carriers can set up maximum prices once a month 
for their commodity shippers, but no minimum prices will be set; (iii) Shippers will still be 
able to negotiate lower freight rates than the announced maximum rates. It is hoped that the 
new pricing rules would end the sudden huge GRIs (e.g. over $1,000) per 40ft container on 
the Asia-Europe route, which have happened 9 times in 2015.  
 
3.4 Pricing and contracting literature 
Academic literature on contracting and pricing in container shipping supply chains is scarce.  
Zhou and Lee (2009) addressed the transport service pricing decisions considering the ECR 
cost. In a monopoly market (with a single carrier), they characterized the pricing strategy 
analytically. In a duopoly market with symmetric carriers, they showed that there is a unique 
Bertrand Nash Equilibrium and derived its analytic properties. Yin and Kim (2012) examined 
shipping lines’ optimal freight tariff to forwarders. Noting that the container transport service 
cannot be stored, they designed all-unit quantity discount schemes with multiple price-break 
points to maximize both the liner’s profit and the forwarders’ profit.  
 
Fan et al. (2014) analysed the pricing strategies for fronthaul and backhaul shipping trips in 
liner shipping. They employed Johansen’s vector error correction model to identify the 
critical trade imbalance ratios that disintegrate the freight rates for both directions. Lee, Boile 
et al. (2012) presented a three-level model to capture the interactions among oligopolistic 
ocean carriers, port terminal operators, and land carriers. A game theoretic approach is used 
to model these players who compete with each other in their pricing and routing decisions.  
 
Liu and Yang (2015) considered the joint slot allocation and dynamic pricing problem in a 
container sea-rail multimodal transport system with uncertain demands. A two-stage optimal 
model is presented. The first stage is formulated as a stochastic integer programming model 
to determine long-term slot allocation in contract market and empty container allocation. The 
second stage is formulated as a stochastic nonlinear programming model to determine 
dynamic pricing and slot allocation in each period of free market. The chance constrained 
programming and robust optimization methods are used to transform the stochastic models 
into deterministic models. Xu et al. (2015) extended the model in Zhou and Lee (2009) to a 
three-echelon supply chain consisting of one carrier, two forwarders, and shippers. They 
presented a Stackelberg game model and analysed the optimal joint pricing policy and the 
repositioning cost sharing policy from the perspective of the whole service chain. Chen et al. 
(2016) studied a two-port system in which the shipments can be classified into two categories: 
goods and waste. The trade imbalance, e.g., on the trans-Pacific route and the Asia-Europe 
route, motivates carriers to accept low-valued waste to be shipped at bargain rates. Of course, 
when the imbalance still exists, empty containers must be repositioned from a surplus 
location to a shortage location. A monopoly and a duopoly model were built to find the 
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optimal pricing strategy for carriers. Sensitivity analysis was also provided to analyse how 
trade imbalance, cost structure, price and competition intensity affect the profit.  
 
3.5 A pricing model involving shipping line and freight forwarders 
In the following, we briefly introduce the pricing and contracting model in Xu et al. (2015). 
Consider a container shipping supply chain consisting of a single shipping line and two 
freight forwarders providing transportation services between two ports. The two freight 
forwarders are located at two ports and only providing services from their home port to the 
other port. The shipping line acts as the leader and sets wholesale prices to freight forwarders. 
The freight forwarders then set service prices to shippers to attract cargo. Due to the trade 
imbalance, the shipping line has to reposition empty containers between two ports to balance 
the contain flows. The following notation is used: 
 
wi:  the shipping line’s wholesale price per unit to freight forwarders, i=1,2; 
pi:  the freight forwarder’s price per unit to shippers, i=1,2; 
di:  the contract quantity from customers from port i to the other port, i=1,2; 
ci:  the unit transportation cost of laden containers from port i to the other port, i=1,2; 
ei:  the unit transportation cost of empty containers from port i to the other port, i=1,2; 
αi:  the volume of potential demand from freight forwarder i from port i to the other port, 
i=1,2; 
βi:  the price sensitivity factor, which measures the responsiveness of demand from port i to 
the other port to the price, i=1,2; 
 
We assume a linear model for shippers’ demand such as: di = αi – βi pi, for i=1,2. The freight 
forwarders’ profits (πi , i=1,2) and the shipping line’s profit (π) can be expressed as 
πi = (pi – wi) di, i=A, B; 
π = (w1 – c1) d1 + (w2 – c2) d2 – e1 (d2 – d1)
+ – e2 (d1 – d2)
+. 
 
Note that the shipping line is the leader and sets wholesale prices first. The freight forwarders 
maximize their profits, leading to pi = (αi + βi wi)/(2βi) and di = (αi – βi wi)/2 for i=1,2. 
Corresponding to the demand relationships of both ports (i.e. d2> d1, d2< d1 and d2= d1), it is 
easy to derive the shipping line’s optimal pricing policies under three cases as shown in the 
following Proposition 3.1 (using the first-order condition of the shipping line’s profit 
function). 
Proposition 3.1 (Xu et al. (2015)). The optimal pricing decisions are given by 
(i) If α2 – α1 > ∆
U, then w1 = (α1 + c1β1 – e1β1)/(2β1); w2 = (α2 + c2β2 + e1β2)/(2β2); 
(ii) If α2 – α1 < ∆
L, then w1 = (α1 + c1β1 + e2β1)/(2β1); w2 = (α2 + c2β2 – e2β2)/(2β2); 
(iii) If ∆L ≤ α2 – α1 ≤ ∆
U, then  
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where ∆L = β2(c2 – e2) – β1(c1 + e2); ∆
U = β2(c2 + e1) – β1(c1 – e1). 
 
In the above, case (iii) represents the scenario that d1 = d2. In other words, under the condition 
∆L ≤ α2 – α1 ≤ ∆
U, the optimal pricing decisions of the shipping line and the two freight 
forwarders will lead to a balanced trade demand between ports. This indicates that the 
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shipping line seeks cargo balance by pricing policy. Case (i) represents the scenario that d2 > 
d1, i.e. under the condition α2 – α1 > ∆
U, the optimal pricing decisions of the shipping line and 
the two freight forwarders will lead to an imbalanced trade demand with more demand for 
shipping from port 2 to port 1. Case (ii) can be interpreted similar to (ii). The implication is 
that seeking a balanced realized demand is not always appropriate for the ocean carrier as 
shown in Cases (ii) and (iii). 
 
3.6 Research opportunities 
Fransoo and Lee (2013) have pointed out a few research directions in the areas of contracting, 
pricing, and risk management along the container supply chain. We add a few more areas for 
further research.  
 
• The first area is the contractual relationship between shipping lines and shippers. The 
lack of communication and mutual understanding between shippers and carriers may 
explain the fluctuating service levels. On the one hand, shippers are the victims of 
service unreliability; on the other hand, they could be the root cause of the problem. 
Drewry (2012) reported that the ‘on-time shipment of cargo’ (which involves loading 
a container onto the ship on time) was less than 70%, which implies that the container 
will arrive late at the final destination port even if the originally intended ship voyage 
is on schedule. 
• The second area is the contractual relationship between shipping lines and 
port/terminal operators. Notteboom (2006) showed that over 90% of schedule 
unreliability is port-related. A better contractual relationship between carriers and 
ports with appropriate incentive mechanisms would improve the quality of services. 
• The third area is the pricing strategy of shipping lines. In practice, shipping lines 
design different types of pricing strategies for shippers and freight forwarders with 
different time scales. Further research on the pricing strategies and their applications 
is required. Moreover, an interesting question is whether any relationships exist 
between the pricing strategies of individual shipping lines and the volatile freight 
market.  
• The fourth area is the application of game theory or agent-based models to more 
realistic scenarios. Zhou and Lee (2009) and Xu et al. (2015) proposed the 
Stackelberg game models for the pricing decisions of carriers and forwarders 
considering ECR costs in relatively simple scenarios. It would be desirable to 
generalize these models (e.g. to multiple players).  
• Fifth, setting spot market pricing has been a big challenge in the recent few years. 
Some well-known freight rate index, such as Shanghai Freight Index, is usually the 
average freight rate carriers have charged shippers.  For setting the spot rate, the 
General Rate Increase (GRI) scheme is often used to increase the freight rate. 
However, GRI has been misused recently. In 2015, there were 10 announcement of 
GRIs, in which 9 of them were over $1000. This led to extremely high volatility of 
spot freight rate. The recent agreement between European Commission and 15 major 
shipping lines indicated that GRI will not be allowed in the European routes soon. 
The geographical difference in pricing regulations (cf. Table 1) and the emerging new 
regulations (e.g. GRI ban in European routes) would bring new challenges and 
opportunities for further research.  
• Sixth, the pricing and contracting issue is often considered together with other 
planning issues such as horizontal competition and cooperation (e.g. Alvarez-
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SanJaime et al. 2013), slot allocation (Liu and Yang, 2015), port pricing (e.g. Bae et 
al. 2013; Song et al. 2016), empty container repositioning (Zhou and Lee 2009; Fan et 
al. 2014; Xu et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2016). More research could be undertaken in this 
direction empirically and theoretically. 
 
 
4. Network design and routing 
Network design and routing is related to the competition and cooperation issue, and also the 
pricing and contracting issue from the channel relationship perspective. For example, within a 
strategic alliance, shipping line members have to coordinate their service networks; within a 
vertical channel, shipping line will design their service network taking into account the 
location of their dedicated container terminals; external and internal pricing/contracting 
strategies also affect the service network design and container routing. In this section, we take 
the organizational perspective to address the network design and routing issue. 
4.1 Service network design 
A container shipping network consists of a number of service routes. Each service route 
forms a round trip involving a fixed sequence of port of calls. Each port of call in a service 
route is served at a fixed frequency, normally on a weekly basis, by a set of vessels. The 
container network design problem aims to select ports, construct service routes and deploy a 
fleet of vessels so that service requests/customer demands can be served effectively. A 
number of survey papers have covered this topic, e.g. Christiansen et al. (2004); Christiansen 
et al. (2007); Christiansen et al. (2013); Brouer et al. (2014a); Meng et al. (2014); and Tran 
and Haasis (2015). 
 
In a broad perspective, management decisions in service network design may include: how 
many service routes should be opened; how a service route should be structured in terms of 
port rotation and schedule; which frequency the service route should be; which type of 
vehicles and how many should be deployed in a service route; how to manage the container 
fleet, and how the customer demands should be assigned over the service network (e.g. 
Agarwal and Ergun 2008a; Alvarez 2009; Reinhardt and Pisinger 2012; Mulder and Dekker 
2014; Plum et al. 2014; Wang and Meng 2014). In this view, service network design includes 
a number of sub-problems such as service route design, vessel fleet deployment, vessel 
scheduling, container fleet management, and container cargo routing. More often, these sub-
problems may be treated separately, or in a simplified or aggregated format under the 
umbrella of service network design problem. 
 
In a narrow perspective, service network design mainly focuses on determining the service 
route structures to better service customer demands. Service routes may be created from the 
given set of ports and optimized in a combinatorial optimization way (e.g. Shintani et al. 
2007; Tran 2011; Song and Dong 2013; Plum et al. 2014; Brouer et al. 2014b), or selected 
from a set of candidate service routes that have been pre-specified based on industrial and/or 
historical experience (e.g. Mulder and Dekker 2014; Brouer et al. 2014a; Wang and Meng 
2014; Liu et al. 2014; Dong et al. 2015).  
 
A customer demand may be regarded as a requirement to transport a number of laden 
containers from a specified origin to a specified destination. In a multi-service network, 
transhipment operation represents an interaction among routes. The cost and profitability of 
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the service network depend on the paths chosen to transport the cargo and the vessels 
deployed on service routes.  
 
4.2 Container cargo routing 
Container cargo routing concerns the assignment of customer demands over the shipping 
network in the most economical way. It can be regarded as a sub-problem of service network 
design to evaluate and feedback the performance of a given service network. On the other 
hand, container cargo routing implies which routes will be selected and utilized to transport 
the containers. In that sense, service network design may be regarded as an implicit sub-
problem of container cargo routing problem, e.g. select and utilize a set of candidate service 
routes to serve a set of customer demands.  
 
A large number of studies have been conducted on container cargo routing, e.g. the 
assignment of container shipments over global shipping networks provided by all existing 
shipping lines (Song et al. 2005); container routing using various link-based network flow 
models (Wang 2014); container routing with cabotage constraints (Wang et al. 2013); 
container routing with empty container repositioning (e.g. Brouer et al. 2011; Bell et al. 2011; 
Song and Dong 2012; Bell et al. 2013; Huang et al. 2015); container routing considering 
elastic demand on freight rate (Wang et al. 2015b); cargo routing with network design 
(essentially all network design studies involve cargo routing or demand assignment).  
 
4.3 Complexity of the network design and container routing problem 
Agarwal and Ergun (2008a) proved that the problem of designing a shipping network for 
liner containers is NP-hard by reducing the problem to a Knapsack problem. Brouer et al. 
(2014) further proved that the container shipping network design problem is strongly NP-hard 
by reducing it to a traveling salesman problem (TSP). In some cases, a set of service routes is 
pre-specified. The network design problem then becomes the selection of service routes to 
meet the given customer demands. Brouer et al. (2014a) showed that this problem can be 
reduced to a set-covering problem (e.g. choose the cheapest set of service routes to cover all 
ports), which is also strongly NP-hard. We state these results in the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 4.1 (Brouer et al. 2014a): (i) The problem of designing a shipping network for 
liner containers is strongly NP-hard; (ii) solving the problem with a set of pre-specified 
service routes is also strongly NP-hard. 
 
Since ship deployment and container routing are often part of the shipping network design 
problem, their computational complexity should be studied. We have the following results 
(which can be shown easily by reducing the Knapsack problem to our problems). 
 
Proposition 4.2: Deploying a fleet of vessels over a given set of service routes is NP-hard. 
 
Proposition 4.3: Container routing in a given shipping network is NP-hard if shipments are 
not splitable. 
Proof: We reduce the problem to the Knapsack problem. Suppose given a set of service 
routes N with each route has a common leg and all demands have to be carried across this leg. 
The total capacity of the leg is denoted by M. Each demand (i.e. shipment) has a volume wi 
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and revenue ci. The selection of the demands to maximize the total revenue subject to service 
capacity is equivalent to the 0-1 Knapsack problem. This completes the proof. 
 
In the following, we first introduce a container routing model for a given set of shipping 
service routes, then present the problem of designing a single service route including route 
generation. Finally, we discuss the relevant literature and the research opportunities.  
 
4.4 A model of single service route design 
The problem of designing a single service route include both tactical decisions (port rotation, 
ship deployment) and operational decisions (ship sailing speed, container loading/unloading, 
empty container repositioning). Here the main challenge lies in port rotation generation and 
selection. 
 
In fact, single service route design is a combinatorial optimisation problem. For example, let 
us consider a seven-port service route in which five of these ports may be called twice on a 
single round-trip. This gives rise to a total of 12 port calls and nearly 12! ≈ 108 different port 
rotations. It is computationally difficult to evaluate all these port rotations. However, by 
observing the empirical shipping service routes, it is possible to narrow down the port 
rotations substantially, even to a manageable size. 
 
Song and Dong (2013) introduced a new concept called directed simple cycle, which is 
defined as a graph in which all nodes are connected forming a single closed loop with all 
edges being oriented in the same direction. Empirical data showed that topologically almost 
all shipping service routes can be regarded as a series of such directed simple cycles, of 
which any two neighbouring directed simple cycles are joined by only one common port, as 
shown in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1. Generic shipping service route (Song and Dong 2013) 
Note: (i) hi and Hi refer to the same port; (ii) hi < Hi in the port call sequence 
 
It is observed that in practice the number of directed simple cycles within a shipping service 
route is very small.  Of the 154 service routes in 2008 on three major trade lanes (Asia-North 
America, Asia-Europe, Europe-North America), 45% have only one directed simple cycle, 20% 
have two directed cycles and 16% have three directed cycles (Song and Dong 2013). This 
implies that the problem of designing a single service route can be greatly simplified by 
limiting the number of directed cycles when designing its route structure. 
 
In addition, the knowledge of the port geographic locations is also very useful in designing 
the service route structure and planning ship deployment from the practical perspective. For 
example, if a service route connects only two continents (e.g. trans-Pacific or trans-Atlantic 
service routes), it is practical for a vessel to visit each continent only once on a single round 
trip. This means we can split the ports into two sub-groups according to their geographic 
locations, which will simplify route design.  
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For a given port rotation, the shipping company may further need to deploy ships on the 
service route, meet shipment demand, reposition empty containers, and determine the sailing 
speed in order to minimize the total operating cost. To simplify the narrative, we assume that 
the same type of ship will be deployed on the service route and the sailing speed is constant 
on all sea legs. We also assume that the weekly demand between pairs of ports is constant. 
The following notation is introduced (based on Song and Dong 2013): 
 
Given parameters: 
P: the set of ports on the service route; 
N: the number of port calls on the route. The port calls are indexed from 0 to N – 1; 
ijD : the weekly demand from port call i to port call j;  
p(i): the port to which the ith port call refers on the service route; 
di: the distance in nautical miles from port call i to the next port call on the route; 
hi: the handling rate at port i in TEUs per hour, which represents the number of lifts 
(including both lifting-on and lifting-off activities) in TEUs per hour.  
a
it : the ship approach and docking time (in hours) on port call i when it arrives.  
d
it : the ship exit time (in hours) from port call i when it departs.  
pt :  the total time (in hours) that a ship spends at the ports on a round-trip, including 
approach and docking and exit times. Let pt (i) denote the time that a ship spends on 
port call i. 
st :  the total time (in hours) that a ship spends at sea on a round-trip.  
ijt : the transit time in hours from port call i to port call j.  
l
iC : unit cost of loading containers at port p(i)∈P;  
u
iC : unit cost of unloading containers at port p(i)∈P;  
p
ijC :  unit penalty cost for lost-sales from demand from port call i to port call j;  
fC : the fuel cost (USD/tonne); 
LIC : the average laden container inventory holding cost per TEU per day (USD/TEU/day). 
EIC : the average empty container inventory holding cost per TEU per day (USD/TEU/day). 
V: the set of ship types; 
Capv:  the vessel capacity of vessel type v; 
sG (v):  the daily cost of owning a ship of type v (USD/day), which includes all the costs 
incurred even when the ship is not sailing. For a time-chartered ship it refers to the 
daily charter hire.  
F(v, s): the daily bunker fuel consumption (tonnes/day) for a ship of type v sailing at speed s 
at the sea; 
pF (v): the daily bunker fuel consumption (tonnes/day) for a ship of type v at a port. 
pG (i, v): the fixed ship berthing cost per call at port i for a ship of type v (USD/per call). 
 
Decision Variables: 
ijy : the weekly laden containers that are loaded on a ship from port call i to port call j;  
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ijx : the weekly empty containers that are loaded on a ship from port call i to port call j;  
v: the ship (or vessel) type to be selected for the service route (v∈V). Here a ship type 
can be regarded as a combination of ship attributes such as carrying capacity, 
economic and environmental efficiency indexes. 
vn : the number of ships (of the selected ship type v) to be deployed on the service route.  
s: the sailing speed of ships at sea in nautical miles per hour, which takes a value 
between the minimum speed Smin and the maximum speed Smax.  
 
Mathematically, for a given port rotation, the problem is to find the optimal solution { ijy , ijx , 
v, vn , s} by minimizing the average total daily cost of operating the shipping service, denoted 
by J. The average total daily operating cost of the shipping service route can be defined as the 
number of deployed ships (i.e. vn ) multiplied by the total operating cost incurred by a single 
ship on a round-trip divided by the journey time in days (Ronen 2011). Note that the journey 
time on a round-trip is equal to 7⋅ vn  days in order to maintain the weekly service. Therefore, 
the daily total operating cost is equal to the total operating cost incurred by a single ship on a 
round-trip divided by 7. The mathematical programme is given as follows: 
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ijx  ≥ 0, ijy  ≥ 0, for any i, j; v∈V; vn  is positive integer. (4.12) 
 
In Eq. (4.1), the first term represents the ship cost including crew, repair and maintenance, 
insurance, administration, possibly capital costs etc. The second and third terms represent 
fuel consumption costs at sea and ports respectively. The fourth and fifth terms represent the 
container handling costs at ports for loading and unloading respectively. The sixth term 
represents the port access cost. The seventh term represents the cargo (laden container) 
inventory holding costs. The eighth term represents the empty container inventory in-
transition costs. The last term represents the lost-sales penalty costs. Constraint (4.3) is to 
ensure the flow balance for each port. Constraint (4.4) is to ensure the total number of 
containers (laden and empty) not exceeding the ship capacity in each leg. Here the subscript 
should be understood as the remainder with the mode N when it equals or is greater than N. 
Other constraints are relatively straightforward according to their definitions. 
 
It should be noted that the decision on the vessel type (v) affects not only the vessel capacity, 
but also the ship daily operating cost, the ship bunker fuel consumption, and the ship berthing 
cost. The above formulation aims to minimize the total cost subject to a set of constraints 
such as flow balance, vessel capacity, and speed range. A two-stage approach can be used to 
solve the above problem of designing a single service route: 
 
Stage 1: By limiting the number of directed cycles on the service route and grouping the ports 
according to knowledge of the port geographic locations, we can identify a set of candidate 
port rotations. 
 
Stage 2: For each candidate port rotation, we solve the optimisation problem in (4.1)–(4.12).  
 
Two- or three-stage approaches are quite common in tackling the problem of designing liner 
shipping networks, due mainly to the different planning levels/tasks involved such as 
strategic/tactical level and operational level, but also to technique requirements in order to 
simplify the solution procedure or reduce the computational complexity.  
 
4.5 A link-based network flow model for container cargo routing 
For a given set of shipping service routes, the container routing problem concerns the 
assignment of customer demands across the shipping network in the most economical way, 
which implies the selection of service routes. Link-based (e.g. Agarwal and Ergun 2008a; 
Brouer et al. 2011; Wang 2014), or path-based (e.g. Brouer et al. 2011; Song and Dong 2012) 
network flow models are often used to tackle this problem.  
 
We present an origin-destination (O-D)-link-based model below. To simplify the formulation, 
we assume that container shipment is splitable. In other word, the customer demands for a 
specific O-D pair can be regarded as an aggregated volume that may be fulfilled partially. 
This would enable us to formulate a linear programming model instead of an integer 
programming model. We introduce the notation for the model. 
 
Given parameters:  
P: the set of ports; 
od:  an index to represent the O-D pair from port o∈P to port d∈P; 
Dod: the weekly demand from o∈P to d∈P; 
  
l
pC : the unit cost of loading containers at port p∈P;  
u
pC : the unit cost of unloading containers at port p∈P;  
t
pC : the unit cost of transhipping containers at port p∈P;  
p
odC :  the unit penalty cost for lost-sales from od;  
R: the set of shipping routes; 
Rp: the set of routes that call at port p∈P; 
Nr: the number of port calls on the route r∈R; 
Ir: the set of port call indices on the route r∈R, i.e. Ir := {1, 2, …, Nr}; 
pri: the port that corresponds to the ith port call on route r; 
Ir,p: the set of port call indices corresponding to port p on the route r∈R, i.e. Ir,p := {i∈Ir | 
pri = p}; 
Capr:  the vessel capacity on route r∈R; 
Cri: unit cost of transporting laden containers on vessel on leg i on route r∈R; 
 
Decision variables: 
l
riody , : the number of containers from od that are loaded on the ith port call on route r;  
u
riody , : the number of containers from od that are unloaded on the ith port call on route r;  
f
riody , : the number of containers from od that are carried on board on leg i (from the ith port 
call to the i+1th port call) on route r;  
ody : the fulfilled demand from od;  
 
The objective is to minimize the total cost including i) the laden and empty container loading 
(lifting-on) cost, ii) the laden and empty container unloading (lifting-off) cost, iii) the laden 
and empty container transhipment cost, iv) the lost-sale penalty cost, v) the laden container 
transportation cost on vessel, and vi) the empty container transportation cost on vessel.  
 
To simplify the narrative, we introduce a few intermediate variables. Let lpy , 
u
py , and 
t
py  
denote the total number of container loading operations (including export and transshipment), 
the total number of container unloading operations (including import and transshipment), and 
the number of container transhipment operations at port p, respectively. The container routing 
problem can be formulated as a linear programming model: 
 
∑
∈
++
Pp
t
p
t
p
u
p
u
p
l
p
l
p
yyyy
yyy
yCyCyC
t
p
u
p
l
p
f
riod
u
riod
l
riodod
)({min
,,,
,,,
,
,,
∑∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ∈
+
Rr Ii Pdo
f
riodri
r
yC )(
,
,
})(∑∑
∈ ∈
−+
Po Pd
odod
p
od yDC  (4.13) 
subject to 
∑∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ∈
=
p prRr Ii Pdo
l
riod
l
p yy
, ,
, , for any p∈P; (4.14) 
∑∑ ∑
∈ ∈ ∈
=
p prRr Ii Pdo
u
riod
u
p yy
, ,
, , for any p∈P; (4.15) 
∑∑
∈∈
−=−=
Po
op
u
p
Pd
pd
l
p
t
p yyyyy , for any p∈P; (4.16) 
l
riod
u
riod
f
riod
f
riod yyyy ,,1,, +−= − , for any o,d∈P, r∈R, i∈Ir; (4.17) 
  
od
Rr Ii
l
riod yy
o or
=∑∑
∈ ∈ ,
, , for any o,d∈P; (4.18) 
od
Rr Ii
u
riod yy
d dr
=∑∑
∈ ∈ ,
, , for any o,d∈P; (4.19) 
0)(
,
,, =−∑∑
∈ ∈p prRr Ii
l
riod
u
riod yy , for any o,d, p∈P, o ≠ p, d ≠ p; (4.20) 
r
Pdo
f
riod Capy ≤∑
∈,
, , for any r∈R, i∈Ir; (4.21) 
odod Dy ≤ , for any o, d∈P; (4.22) 
l
riody , ≥0, 
u
riody , ≥0, 
f
riody , ≥0, ody ≥0, 
l
py ≥0, 
u
py ≥0, 
t
py ≥0. (4.23) 
 
Eqs. (4.14)–(4.16) represent the total containers that are loaded, unloaded, and transhipped at 
port p. Eq. (4.17) represents the flow balancing for containers at each port for each service 
route. Eqs. (4.18) and (4.19) indicate the total fulfilled demand from od that must be loaded at 
port o and unloaded at port d. Eq. (4.20) states that the number of containers unloaded and 
loaded for each od at a transhipment port must be balanced. Constraint (4.21) represents the 
vessel capacity constraints on each leg for each route. Constraint (4.22) states that the 
fulfilled demand does not exceed the customer demand. Constraint (4.23) represents the non-
negative of the relevant decision variables. 
 
The majority of general shipping network design models in the literature take the tactical 
planning perspective (often assuming demand is given and constant). They focus on decisions 
such as port rotations, service route selection, ship deployment, and container assignment. 
When operational decisions such as vessel sailing speed and container loading/unloading 
times are included, the research is often narrowed down to a specific network structure or a 
single service route.  
 
In practice, a shipping line cannot reshuffle its shipping service routes overnight because 
shipping schedules are fixed months in advance. More practically, a shipping line may adjust 
its service routes and ship deployment on a small scale from time to time, e.g. in response to 
changes in demand volume and pattern, and to delivery of new ordered vessels. Therefore, 
the design of a single service route is also practically important. 
 
4.6 Research opportunities 
Earlier research on shipping network design (before 2000) seldom considered a regular 
service frequency. Nowadays, a weekly service has become almost the industry standard in 
container shipping. Such regularity simplifies the supply chain operations for shippers, ocean 
carriers, and terminal operators. Therefore, recent research (e.g. Agarwal and Ergun 2008a, 
and the relevant literature onwards) has generally adopted the weekly service frequency in 
container network design. Although a number of interesting studies have been conducted (see 
the review papers by Tran and Haasis 2015, Brouer et al. 2014a, and Meng et al. 2014), 
container shipping network design is still a young topic. Since the network design and 
container routing problem consists of a few sub-problems, which are by themselves NP-hard, 
the topic is challenging overall. Brouer et al. (2014a) provided a benchmark suite of data 
instances (termed LINER-LIB-2012), which may facilitate the research development in 
container shipping network design. We suggest the following areas for further research:  
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• General network design and container routing: a realistic shipping network for most 
global shipping lines includes multiple routes with multiple butterfly ports and 
multiple transhipments. Therefore, port rotation generation and container routing in 
general networks deserve more research. Recently Plum et al. (2014) made an attempt 
in this direction. But their mixed-integer programing model was only able to solve 
two of the smallest instances of LINER-LIB-2012 due to the large number of 
variables and constraints. On the other hand, Meng et al. (2014) pointed out that most 
of the existing literature in the design of liner container shipping networks is devoted 
to itinerary design and ship deployment assuming a fixed sailing speed and without 
considering schedules. Two research directions can be pursued: One is to develop 
more efficient solution methods; the other is to incorporate some operational 
decisions such as vessel sailing speed and port handling activities. 
• Specific/single-route design and container scheduling: specific route structure design 
includes the hub-and-spoke network (e.g. Imai et al. 2009; Meng and Wang 2011), 
and single-route design (e.g. Shintani et al. 2007; Song and Dong 2013). This type of 
research models the operational decisions in great detail together with route structure 
creation and ship deployment. Thus, the interaction between the strategic/tactical 
decisions and the operational decisions could be more appropriately modelled. Further 
research includes identifying other types of route design problems based on empirical 
data and practical requirements, and extending the research to multiple service routes 
or more general networks. Brouer et al. (2014b) and Plum et al. (2014) have made 
some attempts in this direction.  
• Design of intermodal container transport networks: Container transport is a typical 
example of intermodal transportation. Note that the origins and destinations of laden 
containers are usually inland locations, although some containers are unpacked at sea 
ports. From the supply chain management perspective, it would be desirable to design 
intermodal transport networks for both seaborne transport and inland transport. Only a 
couple of studies have taken the global intermodal perspective. For example, Tran 
(2011) considered a single-route design problem including decisions such as port 
choice, sequence of selected ports, and loading/unloading ports for each shipment by 
minimizing the total cost consisting of ship cost, port tariff, inland transport cost, and 
inventory cost. Meng et al. (2012) developed a model for the design of a large-scale 
intermodal liner shipping service network. Laden container routing in the inland 
transportation network is combined with maritime network design. Empty container 
flows in the hinterland and maritime networks were also discussed. More research is 
still required in this area. 
• Dynamic and uncertain factors: Almost all shipping network design models in the 
literature have assumed that all demands are deterministic, and even fixed on a 
weekly basis. In reality, container demand fluctuates significantly from season to 
season. Both long-term contractual demand and spot-market demand contribute to the 
fluctuations. Future research should incorporate dynamic and uncertain factors 
including customer demand, port operations, and sea conditions into shipping network 
design and container routing.  
• Alliance factor: on some shipping routes, especially on trans-Pacific and Asia-Europe 
routes, most shipping lines have formed alliances to provide shipping services jointly. 
This brings up another challenging issue for global shipping lines, i.e. how to design 
an integrated shipping network, in which some services are operated solely by the 
company, whereas other services are operated under the alliance. Existing literature 
on shipping network design has focused either on a single company or an alliance, 
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with little attention on the coordination of the two. On the other hand, the problem of 
designing networks for multiple shipping lines simultaneously in a competition 
context has not been studied.  
 
5. Ship scheduling and slow steaming 
Ship scheduling brings the time dimension into shipping service planning. In a broad 
viewpoint, ship scheduling covers ship deployment, schedule design, speed selection, and 
dynamic routing and scheduling. This implies that both tactical and operational decisions 
may be involved in ship scheduling. For example, some of them may be included in service 
network design problem whereas others may be incorporated into disruption management 
problem. In a narrow viewpoint, ship scheduling concerns the development of vessel arrival 
and departure timetables, and the selection of planned sailing speed. Slow steaming refers to 
the practice that a ship is planned to sail at a speed significantly less than its designed speeds, 
which can be regarded as a component of ship scheduling. This section takes the narrow 
viewpoint of ship scheduling and focuses on ship schedule design and planned speed 
selection.  
 
5.1 Ship scheduling 
The ship scheduling problem (not limited with container shipping) has been covered in a few 
survey papers, e.g. Ronen 1983; Ronen 1993; Christiansen et al. (2004); Christiansen et al. 
(2007); Psaraftis and Kontovas (2013); Christiansen et al. (2013); Brouer et al. (2014a); 
Meng et al. (2014); and Tran and Haasis (2015). 
 
In container shipping, ship scheduling involves determining the planned arrival and departure 
times on each port call for service routes, where the port rotations of the service routes are 
often given. The schedules essentially specify the container transit times for each pair of ports. 
Once the schedule is designed, the speeds of the containerships are largely determined. 
Therefore, the ship scheduling problems always include speed selection/optimization either 
explicitly or implicitly.  
 
An important characteristic of container shipping is the presence of various uncertainties. 
This causes ships to arrive at ports out of the planned time windows, which is called schedule 
unreliability. Due to the cascading effect, once a ship is delayed at one port, it is likely to be 
delayed at subsequent ports. An empirical survey showed that over 93% of schedule delays 
were caused by port-related uncertainty factors such as port access and terminal operations 
(Notteboom 2006). Recent statistics shows that the actual arrival for all vessel calls deviated 
from the schedule by about 0.6 days (Drewry 2012). The causes of schedule unreliability and 
its impact on the stakeholders in the container shipping supply chain were further illustrated 
in Vernimmen et al. (2007). 
 
Very few studies have addressed the container ship scheduling problem taking into account 
the uncertainty at ports and/or at sea. Wang and Meng (2012b) developed a mixed-integer 
non-linear stochastic model for the liner ship route scheduling problem with sea contingency 
and uncertain port times in order to minimize the ship cost and bunker cost, while fulfilling 
the port-to-port transit time constraints. Ship delays are not allowed. Wang and Meng (2012a) 
considered the robust schedule design problem for a liner ship route. The objective is to 
achieve the optimal trade-off between buffer time allocation and schedule robustness in terms 
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of reliability, integrity, and stability. Qi and Song (2012) designed an optimal containership 
schedule on a service route with uncertain port times by minimizing an expected objective 
function consisting of fuel consumption and delay penalty. They showed that the shortest leg 
is the most problematic leg on a round-trip when designing the optimal schedule to achieve 
100% service level and minimizing the fuel consumption. In Wang and Meng (2012a) and Qi 
and Song (2012), the vessel speed is determined implicitly with the aim to catch up with the 
schedule as much as possible if the vessel has been delayed. Song et al. (2015) considered a 
joint tactical planning problem for the number of ships, the planned maximum sailing speed, 
and the liner service schedule in order to simultaneously optimize the expected cost, the 
service reliability and the shipping emission in the presence of port time uncertainty. A multi-
objective genetic algorithm was applied to obtain Pareto-optimal solutions.  
 
Wang et al. (2014b) formulated the ship route schedule design problem into a mixed integer 
nonlinear nonconvex optimization problem. The model is deterministic but the availability of 
port in a week (defined as port time window) is considered. A similar deterministic schedule 
design problem using dynamic programming method was addressed in Wang et al. (2015a). 
 
5.2 Slow steaming 
Slow steaming may be defined as the practice of sailing cargo ships at speeds significantly 
lower than their design speed. Slow steaming in the container shipping industry started 
around 2008, when the market began experiencing significant overcapacity, decreasing trade 
demands, declining freight rates, and increasing fuel prices. Slow steaming acted as one of 
the effective cost-cutting strategies to mitigate the impact of the global economic crisis in 
2008 on the container shipping industry. The designed speed of a containership is usually in 
the range between 23 knots and 26 knots. Slow steaming is classified into three levels: 
normal slow steaming (~21 knots); extra slow steaming (~18 knots), and super slow steaming 
(~15 knots). Nowadays, almost every shipping line has adopted slow steaming to a large 
degree. 
 
The vessel sailing speed has a significant impact on the total operating cost (Notteboom and 
Vernimmen 2009). The bunker fuel consumption of vessels increases approximately 
cubically with the speed of the vessel (Ronen 1983; Wang and Meng 2012c). When the 
bunker fuel price is around $500 per tonne, the fuel consumption cost constitutes about 75% 
of the ship operating costs for a large containership, and reducing the sailing speed by 20% 
from its designed speed can reduce daily bunker consumption by 50% (Ronen 2011).  
 
The steep increase in oil prices in 2009 drove containership operators to reduce the sailing 
speed of their vessels in order to reduce bunker fuel consumption and the operational cost. 
Slower sailing speed leads to a longer transit time of the shipping service loop, which 
requires adding one or more vessels to the service loop in order to maintain the weekly 
service frequency. Research showed that the resulting bunker cost savings from slower 
sailing speed are sufficient to compensate the cost of chartering in and operating the 
additional vessels for a given service route (Vernimmen et al. 2007). The benefit would be 
more obvious if the shipping line has already had spare vessels in the fleet. In that sense, 
slowing down the vessel speed could absorb more vessels and overcome the overcapacity 
issue. Drewry Shipping Consultant estimated that about 7% of the world’s containership fleet 
has been absorbed via slow steaming.  
 
  
Ronen (2011) presented a cost model to analyze the trade-off between reducing ship speed 
and adding extra ships to a container service route by minimizing the annual operating cost of 
the route. Wang and Meng (2012c) optimized vessel speed on each leg of each ship route in a 
shipping network considering container routing. A mixed integer nonlinear programming 
model is formulated and solved using an approximation method. Psaraftis and Kontovas 
(2013) comprehensively reviewed the models in which ship speed is one of the decision 
variables in maritime transportation. They classified the models according to a set of 
parameters: optimization criterion, shipping market, decision maker, fuel price, freight rate, 
fuel consumption function, ship fleet, cargo inventory costs, port-related variables, and 
emissions. The ship sailing speed and the number of deployed ships are two critical decisions 
in the slow steaming practice. Psaraftis and Kontovas (2014) raised the awareness of various 
factors such as payload, weather conditions, hull conditions, fuel price, state of the market, 
inventory in-transit, mixed chartering, which may affect the ship speed decisions. 
 
Ferrari et al. (2015) claimed that slow steaming induces narrowing of the sample of the direct 
call ports per service, which increases inter-port competition. They discussed the impact of 
slow steaming on finance, service differentiation, environment, and inter-port competition. 
Wong et al. (2015) presented a slow steaming decision support sustainability model to 
balance the operation decision on speed reduction with the factors on bunker cost, shipment 
delay, and carbon emission. Song et al. (2015) analysed the relationships between multiple 
objectives and decision variables, and presented a simulation-based non-dominated sorting 
genetic algorithm to simultaneously optimize the expected cost, service reliability and 
shipping emissions in the presence of port time uncertainty. Mansouri et al. (2015) provided a 
comprehensive review to examine the potential of multi-objective optimization as a decision 
support tool to achieve the trade-off between environmental objectives and economic 
objectives. 
 
Cariou (2011) discussed the sustainability of slow steaming. He stated that slow steaming can 
only be sustained given a bunker fuel price of at least $350 per tonne for the main container 
trades. However, since the fuel price has dropped from over $500 per tonne in 2014 to less 
than $350 per tonne in 2015, to less than $200 per tonne in early 2016, there is a lot debate 
and requires a revisit about the viability of slow steaming. We will present two formulations 
below to address the sustainability of the slow steaming practice in a more comprehensive 
way. 
 
5.3 Two models for slow steaming 
As a vessel’s planned sailing speed depends on the number of total vessels deployed (due to 
the weekly frequency requirement), the slow steaming problem is essentially to determine the 
optimal number of vessels to be deployed on a single service route. In this section we assume 
that vessels are homogeneous because our focus is on a specific service route. Before we 
present the slow steaming models, the following notation is introduced: 
 
N: the number of port calls on the route. The port calls are indexed from 0; and the Nth 
port call refers to the vessel sailing back to the first port; 
Dij: the weekly demands in TEUs from port call i to port call j;  
dij: the distance in nautical miles from port call i to port call j on the route; 
n: the number of ships to be deployed on the service route;  
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s: the sailing speed of ships in nautical miles per hour, which takes a value between the 
minimum speed Smin and the vessel design speed S0;  
pt :  the total time (in hours) that a ship spends at the ports on a round-trip; 
p
ijt : the time that a ship spends on port calls i, i+1, …, j; hence 
p
iit  refers to the port time 
on port call i; and pt  = 
p
Nt 10 − ; 
st :  the total time (in hours) that a ship spends at sea on a round-trip;  
ijt : the transit time (in hours) from port call i to port call j;  
l
iC : the unit cost of loading containers on port call i;  
u
iC : the unit cost of unloading containers on port call i;  
fC : the fuel price (USD/tonne); 
LIC : the average laden container inventory holding cost per TEU per day (USD/TEU/day); 
ijr : the revenue from satisfying the demand (USD/TEU) from port call i to port call j;  
sG :  the daily cost of owning a ship (USD/day), which includes all the costs incurred even 
when the ship is not sailing. For a time-chartered ship it refers to the daily charter 
hire;  
sF0 :  the daily fuel consumption (tonnes/day) for a ship sailing at the vessel design speed S0 
at sea; 
sF (s):  the daily fuel consumption (tonnes/day) for a ship sailing at speed s at sea, which is 
given by sF (s) = 
sF0  ⋅ (s / S0)
3 (e.g. Ronen 2011).   
pF : the daily bunker fuel consumption (tonnes/day) for a ship at a port. 
p
iG :  the fixed ship berthing cost per port call i for a ship (USD/call). 
 
Note that the journey time in a round-trip is equal to 7⋅n days in order to maintain the weekly 
service. The total profit of the service route with n vessels over a round-tip period is given by  
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Therefore, the daily profit of the service route with n vessels can be obtained by dividing (5.1) 
by 7n. Note that, st  = 7⋅24⋅n – pt ; s = sN td /0 ; tij = sdt ij
p
ij /+  subject to Smin ≤ s ≤ S0. 
Moreover, 
3
00 )/()( SsFsF
ss ⋅= , where S0 is the designed speed of the vessel. Eq. (5.1) can be 
rewritten as, 
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Note that the number of vessels, n, and the sailing speed, s, are decision variables. With the 
assumption that other system parameters are fixed, we have the following result. 
Proposition 5.1. Suppose a shipping line has a flexible homogeneous vessel fleet. The 
optimal number of vessels to be deployed on the single shipping route is determined by 
n
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subject to Smin ≤ )168/(0
p
N tnd −  ≤ S0 and n is a positive integer. 
 
Note that the first term and the third term in Eq. (5.3) are costs directly incurred to the 
shipping line, whereas the second term (the inventory cost) is normally incurred to the 
shippers. Therefore, the optimal number of vessels, n*, from the shipping line’s perspective 
(under LIC  = 0) will be greater than that from the supply chain’s perspective (under CLI > 0).  
 
Proposition 5.1 assumes that the shipping line has a flexible vessel fleet, i.e. it has the 
flexibility to charter vessels if needed. In practice, a charter contract often runs for several 
years and therefore a shipping line’s vessel fleet may be fixed in the planning horizon. 
Therefore, it is also interesting to examine the vessel sailing speed for a given vessel fleet 
from the viewpoint of the daily profit per vessel. Here we assume that all vessels are 
deployed on the same trade route (not necessarily on a single service route) and each vessel 
earns the same daily profit. The purpose is to investigate how the shipping line balances 
between making more revenue by sailing at higher sailing speeds (implying higher 
operational costs) and making less revenue by sailing at lower speeds (implying lower 
operational costs) for a fixed vessel fleet.  
 
By considering each vessel’s daily profit, i.e. dividing (5.2) by n, we have the following 
result. 
Proposition 5.2. Under a fixed vessel fleet, the optimal number of vessels to be deployed on 
a single shipping route is determined by 
n
* = ∑∑
−
=
−
=
1
0
1
0 7
[
1
{maxarg
N
i
N
j
ijij
n
Dr
n 168
ppf tFC
− ∑∑
−
=
−
=
−
1
0
1
0 7
N
i
N
j
ij
l
iDC
 ∑∑
−
=
−
=
−
1
0
1
0 7
N
i
N
j
ji
u
i DC
 
∑
−
=
−
1
0 7
N
i
p
iG ∑∑
−
=
−
=
−⋅−
1
0
1
0 0
)(
168
N
i
N
j
ij
N
p
ijp
ij
LI
D
d
td
t
C
] 
23
0
3
00
)168(168 p
N
sf
tnnS
dFC
−⋅
− } (5.4) 
subject to Smin ≤ )168/(0
p
N tnd −  ≤ S0, and n is a positive integer and not greater than the 
fleet size. Since n is usually not large, the optimal n* may be found from the interior point 
from the minimum feasible n to the maximum feasible n. 
 
From Proposition 5.2, it is clear that the optimal n* depends on many factors including the 
freight rate, bunker fuel cost, port fixed and variable costs, and cargo inventory cost 
(associated with cargo value and interest rate). An interesting point is that the optimal vessel 
deployment (slow steaming) in Proposition 5.1 differs substantially from that in Proposition 
5.2. The main reasons are that two models take different perspectives based on different 
assumptions. The first model is to minimize the daily cost of the service route with a flexible 
vessel fleet. It is assumed that vessels can be chartered in or out as an additional decision 
variable. The second model is to maximize the daily profit of each individual vessel for a 
fixed vessel fleet. Therefore, their application context is different.   
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The direct result of slow steaming is a reduction in fuel consumption, which implies a 
reduction in pollutant emissions from shipping. Due to the general public’s increasing 
concerns about climate change and shipping emissions from the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), it is not surprising to see that one of the most cited reasons for slow 
steaming is to reduce pollutant emissions and bring about more environmentally-friendly 
shipping operations. However, more fundamental causes are probably to absorb excess 
shipping tonnage and to cut back on bunker fuel costs.  
 
Cariou (2011) stated that slow steaming can only be sustained if the bunker fuel price is at 
least $350–$400 per tonne for the main container trades. However, his argument is based on a 
cost model consisting of three components: the fuel consumption cost, the vessel operating 
cost, and the in-transit inventory cost as shown in Eq. (5.3). Note that a low freight rate and 
vessel fleet overcapacity can significantly affect ocean carriers’ ship deployment as shown in 
Eq. (5.4). Therefore, model (5.4) can better explain why slow steaming is still immensely 
popular among ocean carriers even though the bunker fuel price has been below $350/tonne 
in most months in 2015.  
 
5.4 Research opportunities 
We suggest the following areas for further research:  
 
• Evidence has shown that slow steaming enables shipping lines to absorb excess 
tonnage and reduce fuel consumption. However, the benefit to shippers and other 
stakeholders in the supply chain has not been adequately demonstrated. For example, 
although it is claimed that slow steaming offers opportunities to catch up with delays 
and improve schedule reliability, there is insufficient statistics supporting this claim. 
How to spread the benefits along the container shipping supply chains requires more 
research.  
• Schedule unreliability has been a long outstanding issue in container shipping. It has a 
huge impact on the downstream supply chain operations. Firstly, the ship schedule 
should be better designed considering the uncertainty explicitly. Secondly, although 
port uncertainty is shown to be the dominant source of schedule unreliability, this 
factor is believed to be highly related to shipping lines’ and shippers’ operations that 
are beyond the control of port/terminal operations. Therefore, a better coordination 
between shipping lines, port/terminal operators, and shippers is required for ship 
scheduling and operations. Lee, Lee and Zhang (2015) analysed three years’ worth of 
historical data on a leading shipping liner to estimate the port duration time and then 
used mathematical modelling to identify a quantitative relationship between service 
reliability, port time uncertainty and bunker cost. They showed an example of using 
data from industry to identify modelling and calibration parameters. In the literature, 
most of the scientific discussion is based on modelling, and there is a lack of support 
from historical data.  
• Slow steaming, ship scheduling and speed selection are closely related to operating 
cost, shipping emissions, and service reliability. It is desirable to model these 
decisions as a multi-objective optimization problem (e.g. Wong et al. 2015; Song et al. 
2015; Mansouri et al. 2015). More research and application in this direction could be 
done.  
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• Slow steaming provides more opportunities for shipping lines to differentiate their 
services, e.g. express service versus slow services; fast headhaul versus slow backhal; 
slowing down speed by fewer direct call ports versus slowing down speed by adding 
vessels; etc. On the other hand, slow steaming may lead to competition between hub 
ports as pointed out by Ferrari et al. (2015). Very little analytical work has been done 
in this direction. 
• Fuel consumption is one of the largest ship operational costs. This is the main reason 
that shipping lines have adopted slow steaming widely since 2008. However, with the 
fuel price fell down substantially in 2015, it poses strategic questions for carriers, e.g. 
whether to consider laying up vessels, speeding up vessels to differentiate services, 
changing routes (e.g. taking the longer routes by avoiding canal passage charges or 
piracy areas), and revisiting the concept of economy of scale for mega-vessels.  
 
6. Empty container repositioning 
Empty container repositioning (ECR) may be considered within the shipping pricing strategy 
so that empty flows can be intentionally reduced by decreasing the degree of demand 
imbalance through appropriate pricing in two directions. ECR can also be mitigated by 
horizontal cooperation (e.g. slot exchange or container exchange) and vertical cooperation 
(e.g. improving visibility of container flows in the transport chain). Service network design 
and routing may also include ECR as a sub-problem because both laden and empty containers 
are moving over the same shipping network. Braekers et al. (2011) provided a literature 
review on empty container repositioning models at different planning levels, i.e. strategic, 
tactical, and operational levels. Khakbaz and Bhattacharjya (2014) reviewed the maritime 
ECR literature published between 1994 and 2013 in the fields of engineering, management, 
transport and logistics. Song and Dong (2015) gave a survey on ECR problems from the 
supply chain perspective and as well as from the modelling technique perspective. 
 
ECR has been an important issue for the shipping industry in the last two decades, partially 
due to the rapid growth of container shipping and the severe imbalance of trade demands. A 
number of studies have been conducted to estimate the economic burden of empty container 
movements. For example, Rodrigue et al. (2013) found that shipping companies spent about 
US$110 billion per year to manage their container fleets (e.g. purchases, maintenance, 
repairs), of which US$16 billion (or 15 percent) were spent on repositioning empty containers. 
ECR (particularly by trucks inland) could result in significant environmental and social 
impacts such as additional emissions and congestions. However, based on the literature and 
our interviews with industries, shipping companies rarely make use of operational tools or 
models to assist them in their decisions related to ECR.  
 
In this section, we will first discuss the commonality and differences between ECR and 
traditional inventory management. We will then classify the ECR problems into two broad 
types: quantity decision and cost estimation. We focus on the quantity decision type in this 
section. Relevant literature will be reviewed and an example of inventory control models will 
be introduced. 
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6.1 Relationship between empty container repositioning and inventory management 
Although both inventory in production-inventory systems and empty containers in ocean 
transport serve the same function of satisfying external customer demand, they differ in 
several aspects:  
 
i) In production-inventory systems, inventory is the real product itself and is purchased 
from producers. The incremental cost is the product price. The holding cost, which is 
usually lower than the capital cost, and salvage cost can be high.  In ECR, the container 
is equipment that is usually owned by the carrier. The major cost consists of the moving 
cost, and the holding cost is mainly the storage cost.  
ii) In production-inventory systems, most inventories are purchased directly from producers, 
though some may be transferred from the focal company’s own warehouses. In ECR, 
most of the empty containers come from other ports (either as empty containers, or as 
laden containers but unloaded to become empty containers at these ports). Hence, a) the 
interaction among ports is critical, b) lead time (mainly seaborne transportation time) is 
usually known and can be controlled internally though the amount to be transported is 
constrained by available vessel capacity and the available empty containers at other ports 
(this is further complicated by inland demurrage and detention cost issues), and c) the 
seaborne transportation cost mainly consists of the loading and unloading handling cost 
paid to terminal operators since empty containers are usually carried by shipping lines’ 
own vessels.       
iii) In ocean transport, the shipping is two-way with the same capacity while the demand 
(laden containers) can be different each way. Thus, it involves: a) where to store the 
empty containers, b) when to ship the empty containers from one port to another port, 
and c) how to charge the shipper for implicit cost.   
iv) ECR is in some ways similar to reverse logistics and packaging logistics. However, in 
reverse and packaging logistics, the reusable materials are sold to and owned by the 
consumers, whereas in container shipping the empty containers and laden containers are 
interwoven as the containers become empty and loaded repeatedly in the container’s life 
cycle, and the containers are normally owned by the ocean carriers rather than by the 
customers. 
 
Nevertheless, from the operation management perspective, it is interesting to contrast the 
shipping container logistics with the traditional manufacturing logistics. Regarding empty 
containers as inventories that are used to meet customer demands, a similarity emerges 
between the ECR problem and the production-inventory system. The similarity is that both 
inventories and empty containers are moved and stored from one location to another to meet 
external customer demand with a goal to minimizing the incurred total cost. Thus inventory-
based control policies may be used to reposition empty containers. Our interview with a 
European shipping consultant revealed that many shipping lines are using inventory-based 
policies to reposition empty containers from Europe to Asia (e.g. storing empty containers at 
European ports up to a certain volume or a certain amount of time before repositioning them 
to Asian ports, or immediately repositioning an empty container to Asia whenever possible). 
This implies that in practice shipping lines are indeed explicitly or implicitly applying the 
concept of inventory control to manage empty container logistics.  
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6.2 ECR problem classification 
There are two broad types of ECR problems: quantity decision and cost estimation. In 
quantity decision, carriers need to decide how many empty containers to keep at each port, 
and when and how many to move from one port to another. In cost estimation, the underlying 
idea is that moving empty containers only generates income when the containers become 
laden with shippers’ products. Hence, an interesting and important question is how much cost 
is incurred in repositioning empty containers so that they would be ready for the next 
shipment.      
 
For quantity decision, according to the modelling techniques and the form of the proposed 
solutions, ECR models may be classified into two streams (Song and Dong 2015). The first 
stream adopts network flow models and often applies mathematical programming to produce 
a set of arc-based (or origin-destination based) matrices, which specify the quantity of empty 
containers to be moved on an arc (i.e. from one node to another) in the network. The 
underlying concept is flow balancing, i.e. the container flows out of a node should be equal to 
the flows into the same node. The second stream adopts inventory control models to produce 
decision-making rules, which are able to determine the amount of empty containers to be 
repositioned into/out of a node dynamically by utilizing the information of how many empty 
containers are available and/or to be available across the system.  
 
For cost estimation, ECR is combined with the shipment pricing decision. Different from the 
quantity decision which responds to uncontrollable demands, cost estimation tends to actively 
associate the flow balancing with shipping contracts which influence customer demands (e.g. 
Zhou and Lee 2009). In other words, the shipment price is determined after considering the 
cost of repositioning empty containers. This type of problem has been discussed in the 
section on pricing and contracting. In the rest of this section, we focus on models for quantity 
decision.  
 
6.3 Network flow models for empty container repositioning 
 As the fundamental reason that causes empty container repositioning is the trade imbalance, 
it is natural to use network flow models to balance the flow in the shipping networks. 
Network flow mathematics models can generate tactical decision plans. At the operational 
level, due to the dynamic operations and uncertainty, the tactical plan for ECR may not be 
implemented exactly, e.g. there may be a lack of empty containers to be repositioned out, or a 
lack of available space on the vessel to carry the empty containers. Nevertheless, the 
generated plan could still be applied to stochastic situations with the help of simple 
operational rules, e.g. if not enough empty containers or spare vessel capacity is available, 
then the repositioned-out empty containers can be split among destination ports 
proportionally according to the plan, and the unfulfilled amount could be satisfied later on.  
 
Major shipping lines operate global service networks consisting of multiple shipping service 
routes. In the literature many sophisticated network flow models have been developed for 
ECR on multiple service routes. These include time-space network models (e.g. Erera et al. 
2005; Brouer et al. 2011; Song and Dong 2012; Epstein et al. 2012; Chao and Yu 2012; Chao 
and Chen 2015), a stochastic programming model (Cheung and Chen 1998; Erera et al. 2009), 
scenario-based linear programming (Di Francesco et al. 2009), a sample average 
approximation-based linear programming model (Long et al. 2012), and a multi-scenario 
mixed-integer programming model (Di Francesco et al. 2013); profit-based container 
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assignment models (Wang et al. 2015b); a two-stage empty container coordination model 
among ocean carriers (Zheng et al. 2015b). 
 
Network flow models were also developed for ECR at the regional level between port 
terminals and inland depots (cf. the references in Braekers et al. 2011; Braekers et al. 2013; 
Furio et al. 2013; Olivo et al. 2013; Sterzik et al. 2015). 
 
Many of these network flow models are able to capture some important characteristics of the 
underlying ECR problem such as trade imbalance, dynamic operations and uncertainty. 
Depending on the scale and complexity of the problem, the network flow models may be 
solved exactly or approximately.  
 
Challenging issues facing the network flow models include determining an appropriate 
planning horizon, ensuring computational tractability and ensuring robustness of the policy to 
uncertainties. In addition, mathematical programming models often require accurate data, 
timely communication, and centralised management, which are practically difficult. More 
importantly, the underlying logic of such models is hidden from the operations managers, 
which affects their application in practice. 
 
6.4 Inventory control models for empty container repositioning 
A number of studies have taken the inventory control perspective to tackle the ECR problem. 
At the regional level, Du and Hall (1997) proposed a threshold control policy to allocate 
empty equipment in a hub-and-spoke transport network. Li et al. (2004) and Song and Zhang 
(2010) established the optimality of the threshold-type inventory-based control policy in a 
single port subject to uncertain demands. Yun et al. (2011) applied the (s, S)-type inventory 
control policy to reposition empty containers between customers and terminals in an inland 
area with random demands for empty containers. A simulation-based optimization tool is 
applied to find the near optimal (s, S) policy. Dang et al. (2012) and Dang et al. (2013) 
extended the (s, S)-type inventory policy to a port area with multiple depots considering three 
types of decisions: repositioning empties from overseas ports, inland repositioning between 
depots, and leasing from lessors or other companies. Parameterized threshold policies are 
adopted for ECR and a simulation-based genetic algorithm is developed to optimize the 
threshold parameters. 
 
At the global level, Song (2007), Lam et al. (2007) and Shi and Xu (2011) investigated the 
structure of the optimal ECR policies in two-port systems. Song and Dong (2008) developed 
threshold-type policies to reposition empties on cyclic service routes with uncertain demands. 
Li et al. (2007) and Zhang et al. (2014) extended the threshold control policy to multi-port 
systems. Dong and Song (2009) employed the simulation-based optimization method and an 
inventory control-based policy to deal with the joint optimization problem of container fleet 
sizing and ECR. They presented Kanban and base-stock type of control policies for ECR in 
cyclic shipping services and evaluated their performance. Lee et al. (2012) considered the 
joint ECR and container fleet sizing problem in a multi-port system, in which a single-
threshold policy is used to control the inventory and flow of empty containers among ports. 
The infinitesimal perturbation analysis method is applied to improve the computational 
efficiency. Because the formulation assumes that the travel time for each pair of ports is less 
than one period and the shipping service routes are not explicitly considered, the model may 
be more appropriately regarded as a regional (inland or intermodal) network. 
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Most of the inventory control models also capture the important characteristics of the 
underlying ECR problem including trade imbalance, dynamic operations and uncertainty. The 
prominent advantage of these models is the easy-to-understand and easy-to-operate nature of 
the proposed repositioning policies. Often only a modest amount of real-time data is required. 
At the port-to-port global level, most of the literature has focused on a simplified structure of 
the service route or a single service route. This offers opportunities to design optimal or near-
optimal repositioning policies in stochastic situations. However, a specific structure or a 
single service route overly simplifies the routing decisions and excludes the transhipment 
operations, which is an important phenomenon in container shipping operations. 
 
Recently, a couple of attempts have been made to combine the inventory model and the 
network flow model to deal with the ECR problems at the global level. Chou et al. (2010) 
considered the empty container allocation problem on a single service route. A two-stage 
model is formulated. At stage one, an inventory decision-making model with a fuzzy 
backorder quantity is proposed to determine the optimal quantity of empty containers at a 
port. At stage two, a mathematical programming network model is proposed to determine the 
optimal number of empty containers to be allocated between two ports based on the results in 
stage one. The use of the proposed model is demonstrated through a case involving a trans-
Pacific liner route in the real world. However, the authors focused on a single service route. 
Epstein et al. (2012) initially planned to develop a single, integrated, and robust optimization 
model that would address the ECR optimization problem with uncertainties, but realised that 
the time required for finding an optimal solution was too long even for small instances. They 
then opted for developing a two-stage solution approach, which combines a network flow 
model and an inventory model, named the empty container optimization (ECO) tool. The 
ECO tool is based on two decision models supported by a forecasting system. At stage one, 
an inventory model takes into account the uncertainty in container supply and demand and 
determines the safety stock for each node in the network. At stage two, a multi-commodity 
multi-period network flow model addresses the imbalance problem and supports daily empty 
container repositioning and inventory levels. The service level is managed by imposing the 
safety stock as a constraint in the network flow model with the assumption that the forecast 
demand is normally distributed. In addition, the ECO tool uses a collaborative web-based 
optimization framework to address the coordination problem among multiple agents with 
local objectives. However, both Chou et al. (2010) and Epstein et al. (2012) only focused on 
empty container logistics. The movements and routing of laden containers were not 
considered. 
 
6.5 A specific inventory control model for ECR 
We present an inventory control model for a regional ECR problem. The model is based on 
Ng et al. (2012), which is able to characterize the optimal empty container transfer policy 
between two ports/depots in stochastic dynamic situations. Consider a shipping company 
operating a container transport system involving two depots that are located nearby. It is 
assumed that: (i) the company receives random demand for empty containers and random 
supply of laden containers that are returned as empty containers; (ii) unfulfilled demands are 
backlogged; (iii) a single type of containers is considered; and (iv) the transfer lead times 
between the two depots are negligible. The following notation is introduced: 
n: a discrete decision period; 
N: the length of the planning horizon; 
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zi : the net number of containers in a period flowing into depot i (random supply minus 
random demand);  
xi: the level of inventory at depot i; 
un: the quantity of empty containers transferred from depot 1 to depot 2 in period n; 
cij: the cost of transporting a unit of inventory from depot i to depot j; 
hi: the cost of holding one unit of inventory (empty container) for one period at depot i; 
bi: the cost of backlogging one unit of demand for one period at depot i. 
 
In order to describe the system dynamics, let xi,n-1 denote the on-hand inventory level of 
empty containers at depot i at the beginning of period n; and zi,n represent the net number of 
containers into depot i in period n.  Then, the system state, i.e., the inventory levels at the two 
depots, in period n is determined by 
x1,n = x1,n-1 + z1,n – un, and x2,n = x2,n-1 + z2,n + un. 
 
The problem is to find the optimal dynamic repositioning policy {un | 1 ≤ n ≤ N} that 
minimizes the expected cost consisting of inventory holding cost, empty container 
transferring cost, and demand backlogging cost in the planning horizon (with the initial state 
(x1,0, x2,0)).  
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where α is a discount factor (0 < α ≤ 1) and x– = max{0, –x}. Let Vn(x1,n-1, x2,n-1) be the 
expected discounted cost from period n to N. The problem can be formulated into a Bellman 
dynamic equation. We drop the subscript n in the system state and control decision, and 
define the state variable x := (x1, x2). Then, the Bellman dynamic equation is given as follows 
(Ng et al. 2012), 
Vn(x) = 
u
min {Gn(x, u) : –x2
+≤ u ≤x1
+} (3.1) 
Gn(x, u) = c12u
+ + c21u
- + Ln(x, u), and (3.2) 
Ln(x, u) = h1E(x1 + z1 – u)
+ + b1 E(x1 + z1 – u)
– + h2 E(x2 + z2 + u)
+  
+ b2 E(x2 + z2 + u)
– + αEVn+1(x1 + z1 – u, x2 + z2 + u). (3.3) 
 
Define two switching surfaces Dn(x) and Un(x) as follows:  
Dn(x) = min{u | ∂Ln(x, u)/∂u ≥ –c12}  and Un(x) = max{u | ∂Ln(x, u)/∂u ≤ c21}.  
 
Then we are able to characterize the optimal control policy u*n(x) in the state space shown in 
Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Structure of the optimal repositioning policy (Ng et al. 2012) 
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It can be seen that the monotonic switching curves Dn(x) = 0, Dn(x) = x1, x1 = 0, x2 = 0, Un(x) 
= –x2, and Un(x) = 0 divide the entire state space into seven control regions (I) – (VII). In fact, 
the switching curves Dn(x) = x1 and Un(x) = –x2 are in parallel with x1 + x2 = 0; the former 
passes through the intersection point of Dn(x) = 0 and x1 = 0, while the latter passes through 
the intersection point of Un(x) = 0 and x2 = 0. Although the switching curves may slightly 
change shape in different periods n, the division of the seven control regions and the 
monotonic properties of the switching curves remain the same. 
 
From the practical perspective, the optimal repositioning policy in Figure 6.1 provides 
operations managers with insights for making decisions on ECR between depots. It not only 
provides easy-to-understand qualitative managerial knowledge, but also quantitative 
instructions on when and how many empty containers to reposition. How the system state 
affects the repositioning decisions is also revealed. For example, when the system state (x1, x2) 
is located under the line x1 + x2 = –1 with x1>0, the optimal decision un
* = x1; when the state 
(x1, x2) is moving from the curve Dn(x1, x2) = x1 towards the line x1 + x2 = –1, the optimal 
decision un
* is increasing from 0 to x1; when the state (x1, x2) is moving from the curve Dn(x1, 
x2) = x1 towards the right-hand side (i.e. an increasing x1), the optimal decision un
* is 
increasing from 0. Moreover, the structural properties of the optimal policy in Figure 6.1 such 
as monotonicity and region-switching form are useful for constructing easy-to-implement and 
near-optimal policies (cf. Ng et al. 2012 for more details), because the optimal repositioning 
policy may be too complicated and difficult to implement. This idea is similar to using 
threshold policies (e.g. Kanban, base-stock, or hybrid threshold policies) to approximate the 
optimal policy in two-stage stochastic production-inventory systems. 
 
6.6 Research opportunities 
Although a large number of studies have emerged in the last decade or so to address ECR, it 
remains a challenging problem in the container shipping industry. Note that empty containers 
are moved for reasons related to trade imbalance, dynamic operations, uncertainties, size and 
type of containers, lack of visibility and collaboration across the transport chain, and 
transport companies’ operational and strategic practices (Song and Dong 2015). From the 
operations management’s viewpoint, we point out the following research opportunities: 
 
• The most realistic model of ECR would capture characteristics such as trade 
imbalance (by including both laden and empty containers), stochastic factors, 
dynamic operations, multiple types of containers, information sharing and coordinated 
management across the container transport chain. While formulating and solving such 
models is extremely challenging partially due to the fragmented nature of the shipping 
industry, it is still desirable to develop appropriate models incorporating some key 
elements and produce applicable solutions. 
• In the stream of research on network flow models for global container management, 
very few studies (Erera et al. 2005; Brouer et al. 2011; Song and Dong 2012) have 
explicitly considered both laden containers and empty containers at the operational 
level. Even fewer have further taken into account the uncertainty nature of the 
problem. Here the main challenge is the computational complexity arising from three 
factors. Firstly, a fairly long planning horizon is required to incorporate the effect of 
empty container movements because it often takes about a month to reposition an 
empty container from one continent to another, wher
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on a daily basis. Secondly, global shipping lines often operate large-scale shipping 
networks consisting of many interconnected service routes. This incurs the difficulty 
of shipment routing and empty container scheduling. Thirdly, although uncertainty 
may be represented and approximated by multiple samples/scenarios, doing so 
increases the computational complexity.  
• In the stream of research on inventory control models, at either the regional or global 
level of ECR, the majority of studies are limited with a simplified structure of the 
service network or a single service route. The optimality of the repositioning policies 
and the structure of the optimal policies have only been established for rather simple 
systems (e.g. a single port, or two depot/port shuttle services). On the one hand, 
optimal inventory-based repositioning policies for more complicated networks require 
more research. On the other hand, more sophisticated inventory-based policies could 
be developed, e.g. by borrowing the concepts of Kanban and echelon base stock.  
• There has been lack of simulation models for container logistics management in the 
literature. Lai et al. (1995) developed a simulation model to optimize a type of 
heuristic allocation policy for a shipping company to transport empty containers from 
the Middle East to ports in the Far East. Rensburg and He (2005) described a generic 
simulation model of ocean container carrier operations including transporting 
containers from depots to customers according to requirements and from port to port 
according to vessels’ schedules. However, their focus was not on the performance 
evaluation of ECR policies. Dong et al. (2008) developed an event-driven simulation 
tool to evaluate and optimize inventory control-based ECR policies taking into 
account the stochastic nature and dynamic operations of the container shipping 
industry. Simulation offers great flexibility in handling dynamic and stochastic 
situations in a more realistic way. It could serve as a good alternative in situations 
when other modelling approaches are infeasible. 
• As the ECR problem is closely related to other issues in container shipping such as 
network design, fleet deployment, vessel scheduling and shipment routing (Shintani et 
al. 2007; Meng and Wang 2011), more research should be conducted to integrate 
them appropriately with ECR. In addition, vertical and horizontal integration with 
other supply chain members to facilitate empty container management is another 
important area that requires further development both empirically and theoretically.  
• Research on cost estimation should be extended in the following two directions: i) 
assess the practical difficulty and additional cost of tracing and extracting data on 
containers in order to implement ECR solutions and evaluate the potential benefits of 
the implementation; ii) calculate the ECR cost implicit in a laden container business, 
so that a carrier can decide whether to accept or pursue that shipping business. Note 
that the cost will affect the number of laden containers to ship. 
• A couple of practical issues have not been addressed in the regional ECR problems. 
Firstly, ocean carriers charge shippers demurrage and detention costs for holding 
container equipment longer than the agreed period inside and outside the terminal. 
Secondly, regional container movements may be operated by a number of different 
freight forwarders or shippers, which are often beyond the control of ocean carriers 
and difficult to coordinate. Both issues would affect the regional empty container 
management and require further research. 
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7. Safety and disruption management 
Safety and disruption management is related to strategic elements such as policies, 
regulations and other parties’ behaviours, which affect contracting issues. As the insurance 
fee for the shipping routes across piracy area is much higher, the safety issue is normally 
factored into the pricing strategy. Service network design and cargo routing may also take 
into account the safety and disruption issue, e.g. design a longer service route to avoid piracy 
area. The safety and disruption also has operational element such as how to respond to 
unexpected factors and disruptive events. International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the 
United Nations' specialized agency responsible for improving maritime safety and preventing 
pollution from ships. Wang and Foinikis (2001) offered an overview of the formal safety 
assessment of containerships from multiple aspects. Sergi and Morabito (2016) provided a 
survey on quantitative economics of maritime piracy. Qi (2015) summarized the disruption 
management issue in liner shipping industry.  
  
In this section we first discuss the general issues concerning safety and security in container 
shipping, and then explain the disruption management problem. A schedule recovery model 
will be introduced to describe how vessel operators could respond to disruptive events and 
improve supply chain resilience. 
 
7.1 Safety and security management 
Maritime safety and security has always been a priority concern to the shipping industry and 
the governing bodies such as IMO. This is reflected by IMO’s slogan “Safe, secure and 
efficient shipping on clean oceans”. The objective of safety management is to ensure safety, 
to prevent human injury or loss of life, and to avoid damage to the environment and to 
property.  
 
Maritime safety and security may be addressed from different perspectives, e.g. the human 
aspect factors, the technological factors pertaining to ships, and the shipping operational 
factors. Wang and Foinikis (2001) discussed the formal safety assessment of containerships 
from four aspects: operational environment (physical, commercial, regulatory); 
organizational managerial infrastructure; personnel subsystem; and technical & engineering 
system. Yang et al. (2013) reviewed the challenges of maritime safety and the approaches to 
quantify the risks in maritime transportation. 
 
From the container shipping operations’ perspective, Chang et al. (2014) provided an 
empirical analysis of the safety and security risks based on a case study. Through a literature 
review and interviews, they identified 35 risk factors in container shipping operations that 
may cause maritime safety and security related damage. The risk factors are categorized into 
three groups according to the three logistic flows in shipping operations, i.e. information flow, 
physical flow and finance flow. It is shown that risk factors associated with the physical flow 
generally lead to more serious damages than risk factors associated with the information or 
finance flow. 
 
Attack from pirates, as an important risk factor in the physical flow, is worth particular 
mention. Firstly, the pirate risk factor is unique to maritime transport. Secondly, the 
economic impact of piracy is becoming enormous to both shippers and ship-owners. Maersk 
Line expected its own piracy-related costs to double in 2011 to at least US$200 million. 
These costs include insurance premiums, hardship allowances, and the costs of rerouting 
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vessels (Leach 2011). According to a report on April 12, 2013 by CNN, piracy off the Horn 
of Africa costs the world economy US$18 billion a year. Note that Maersk line’s cost 
estimation is for their own company, whereas CNN’s estimation is for the overall 
international trade plus the economic impact on neighbouring East African countries, 
including the pillar sectors of tourism and fishing. Sergi and Morabito (2016) reviewed the 
literature on quantitative economics of maritime piracy, and stated that Somali piracy’s 
impact on the global economy was in the range of $7 to $12 billion in 2010. Jones (2014) 
provided a breakdown of the costs caused by maritime piracy including ransoms, insurance 
premiums, ship rerouting, security equipment, naval forces, prosecutions of pirates, anti-
piracy organizations, and cost to regional economy. 
 
 
IMO has suggested a number of best management practices for protection against maritime 
piracy attacks (BMP4, 2011). These situational measures can be grouped into two categories: 
pre-boarding and post-boarding measures. Pre-boarding measures aim to prevent boarding or 
securing physical access to the ship, including anti-piracy watch, private security, raising 
alarms, increasing lighting, evasive manoeuvring, increasing speed, and using guards. Post-
boarding measures aim to delay or stop pirates from seizing the ship or crew once boarded, 
including enhanced bridge protection, control of access to bridge, closed circuit television, 
protection of equipment stored on the upper deck, safe muster points, and guards. Bryant et al. 
(2014) conducted an empirical research based on 452 cases from 2010–2011, and the result 
strongly supported the adoption of ship protection measures recommended by IMO to prevent 
piracy. 
 
Fu et al. (2010) took the Far East-Europe container liner shipping service as an example, and 
investigated the economic welfare loss (due to competitiveness) and the efficiency loss (due 
to geographical rerouting) caused by Somali piracy. Marchione et al. (2014) developed an 
agent-based model to simulate pirate, vessel and naval forces behaviours. A case study of the 
Gulf of Aden is used to build the model. 
 
7.2 Disruption management 
Disruption is defined as disturbance or problems which interrupt an event, activity, or process 
(Oxford dictionary). Disruption management refers to dynamically recovering from various 
disruption events that prevent the original operational plan from being executed smoothly 
(Yu and Qi, 2004). In the last decade, disruption management has attracted much attention in 
various areas, e.g. airlines, machine scheduling, logistics scheduling, production planning, 
project scheduling, and supply chain coordination (Clausen et al. 2010; Yu and Qi, 2004).  
 
However, disruption management in container shipping was rarely studied. Only recently 
have a few works emerged that look at this issue (Brouer et al. 2013; Li et al. 2015; Qi 2015; 
Li et al. 2016). Disruption is closely related to uncertainty, which is a more generic term. 
Two types of uncertainties may be classified in liner shipping operations: regular 
uncertainties which refer to recurring probabilistic activities or events in shipping operations; 
and disruption events which refer to occasional or one-off events occurring in shipping 
operations (Li et al. 2016). The nature of disruption events indicates that they are not planned 
in the tactical schedule design stage, but should be responded to appropriately after their 
occurrence on a real-time basis and sometimes may be forecasted just before their occurrence.  
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Common types of disruption events in container shipping include: port closure due to high 
wind, port congestion due to industry actions (labour strikes), port closure due to hurricane or 
flooding, terminal unavailability due to quay crane failures, and poor weather such as fog and 
wind. It can be seen that some disruption events are sudden and unpredictable while others 
may be somewhat known in advance. Therefore, disruption management may involve both 
reactive actions and proactive actions to mitigate the impact of disruption events.  
 
Qi (2015) contrasted the similarity and differences in disruption management between liner 
shipping and the airline industry. Both transport modes have pre-specified schedules and the 
consequence of a disruption often leads to delay in arrival at or departure from ports/airports. 
However, the management strategies are quite different: (i) for airlines, it is common to swap 
and re-assign aircraft to scheduled flights after a disruptive situation; for line shipping, 
swapping vessels is impractical because container vessels operate on continuous voyages and 
the vessels are never empty in normal situations; (ii) for airlines, crew recovery is an 
important issue because (cabin) crew are subject to legal and contractual constraints 
regarding their working hours, administrative ground activity, training, and leave. The 
objective of crew recovery is to repair disrupted roster lines while making sure all flights 
have the crew needed to operate them and return the airline back to normal operations as 
quickly and efficiently as possible. Therefore, both crew recovery and flight schedule 
recovery must be tackled in airline disruptive situations, whereas in line shipping, crew 
scheduling is less relevant; (iii) for airlines, speeding up an aircraft is generally not regarded 
as a feasible measure to recover from a delayed schedule because flight schedules are 
designed based on high speeds and there is little room to speed up physically; in liner 
shipping speeding up vessels could be an effective measure to catch up with a delayed 
schedule especially on the longest inter-continent legs. This has become an even more 
powerful strategy in the current shipping practice where most shipping lines have adopted 
slow steaming (17-22 knots) or even super-slow steaming (14-16 knots) while the vessel 
speed is designed to be about 23-26 knots; (iv) for liner shipping, a deep-sea service route 
often consists of a few port calls in one region. This offers an additional option for the 
disrupted vessel to skip port calls or swap port call sequences for recovery; for airlines, this is 
not applicable.  
 
Brouer et al. (2013) were the first to model the optimal recovery action under a given 
disruptive scenario in container shipping. The recovery measures include speeding up, port 
omission, and swapping port calls. A mixed-integer programming model was formulated to 
balance the increased fuel consumption and the impact on cargo flows in the shipping 
network and the service level. They applied the model to four real-life disruptive cases 
(including bad weather, port closure due to labour strike, lack of berth space, and port 
maintenance), and reported that the suggested solutions could reduce costs by up to 58%.  
 
Li et al. (2015) presented nonlinear programming models and dynamic programming 
algorithms to determine the optimal operational action to catch up with a delayed journey in 
liner shipping. Several typical disruption recovery strategies (including vessel speeding up, 
port skipping, and port swapping) were analysed. It was revealed that speeding up is effective 
when experiencing small delays, but major disruptions require skipping and swapping ports 
to recover from the delayed schedule. Both Brouer et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2015) focused 
on schedule recovery after a disruptive event. They used deterministic models and did not 
consider future new delays. Li et al. (2016) formulated stochastic models considering 
multiple regular uncertainties along the service route. In addition, both proactive actions in 
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response to updated forecasts of the disruptive event and reactive actions after the disruptive 
event are modelled on a real-time basis.  
 
7.3 A model for schedule recovery from disruption 
In the following, we introduce an operational model for the reactive strategy of speeding up a 
vessel based on Li et al. (2015). Here the focus is on how a disrupted vessel schedule could 
be recovered by speeding up the vessel taking into account the fuel and delay costs in the 
dynamic system. We introduce the following notation: 
 
N: the number of port calls on the route. The port calls are indexed from 0; and the Nth 
port call refers to the vessel sailing back to the first port. 
di: the distance in nautical miles from port call i to the next port call; 
s: the planned constant sailing speed of ships at sea in nautical miles per hour;  
ti: the planned arrive time on port call i according to the schedule;  
p
it : the time that a ship spends on port call i; 
xi: the amount of delay experienced by the ship before it departs from port call i, where 
x0 refers to the initial delay on the journey; 
si: the sailing speed in knots from port call i to the next port call under the recovery 
strategy, which takes a value between the minimum speed Smin and the vessel design 
speed Smax.; 
a
it : the arrival time on port call i under the recovery strategy; 
Ci: the ship delay penalty cost per unit time on port call i; 
fi(si):  the fuel consumption cost on leg i for the ship sailing at speed si at sea; 
 
It is assumed that: (i) the fuel consumption cost function fi(si) is convex and increasing in si; 
(ii) the ship will not be handled if it arrives at the port earlier than the planned arrival time; 
(iii) the planned schedule is optimal if there is no delay in the system. The problem can then 
be formulated as follows: 
∑
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Li et al. (2015) showed that the above non-linear programming problem is a convex 
programme, which implies that a local minimum is also the global minimum.  
 
The problem can be re-formulated into a dynamic programming problem so that a more in-
depth analysis can be performed on the impact of delay on system performance. Let G(i, x) be 
the minimum total cost incurred from leg i to leg N-1, given that the delay is x when arriving 
at port i. It follows that 
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with the boundary condition G(N, x) = 0.  
 
It is easy to show that G(i, x) is convex and increasing in x (Li et al. 2015). This indicates the 
disproportionality of the marginal cost of speeding up to catch up with different levels of 
delays. In other words, smaller delays can be recovered more economically. It can also be 
shown that when the delay exceeds a certain level, the vessel should not try to speed up 
further even if it is able to because the increased fuel cost would exceed the potential savings 
from catching up with the delay. 
 
7.4 Research opportunities 
We suggest the following areas for further research:  
• The research on safety and security management should be expanded to cover more 
risk factors. Change et al. (2014) identified a variety of risk factors that may lead to 
safety and security issues in container shipping operations. Among a total of 35 risk 
factors, the most important five are: “shippers hiding cargo information (non-
declaration)”, “damage caused by transporting dangerous goods”, “attack from pirates 
or terrorists”, “damage to frozen cargo/reefer containers due to electricity failure”, 
and “unstable weather”. Some of them have rarely been addressed in the literature. 
However, because each of these factors has its unique characteristics, they should be 
tackled individually or in small groups; 
• The IMO's Maritime Safety Committee at its 93rd session (May 2014) approved 
changes to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention regarding a mandatory 
container weight verification requirement on shippers. The requirement making 
container weight verification a condition for vessel loading will become legally 
binding on July 1, 2016. It would be interesting to examine the scope and scale of the 
potential impacts and disruptions to the global container transport supply chain (e.g. 
shippers, ports and shipping lines individually and collectively) when the new SOLAS 
regulations comes into force. In addition, the impact of the 100% container scanning 
requirement on the stakeholders in maritime transport chain deserves more research. 
• Classifying the uncertainties into two groups such as regular uncertainty and 
disruption event may help to develop appropriate solution measures. Regular 
uncertainty can be tackled at both tactical and operational levels, whereas disruption 
events are often tackled at the operational level and in real time. It is therefore 
believed that a variety of strategies at different levels, e.g. policy and regulation, 
supply chain collaboration, robust design, and real-time control policy, should be 
developed. In particular, vertical integration strategies between shipping lines, 
terminal operators, freight forwarders and shippers, and horizontal integration 
strategies among shipping lines could achieve win-win results in safety and disruption 
management; 
• Disruption management has been well studied and applied in the airline industry, but 
it is a new concept in the container shipping industry. Little research has been 
conducted on how disruption events in shipping operations would impact on the entire 
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supply chain. For example, disruption events may result in missing connections in 
container transhipment. Given the importance of transhipment in container shipping, 
there is a need to quantify the economic and environmental impacts of such 
connection misses and to investigate how to appropriately incorporate transhipment 
into the disruption management; 
• Disruption events not only affect ship operations, but also the movements of cargoes 
and empty containers. The emerging concept of synchromodal transportation (Steadie 
Seifi et al. 2014) promoted the idea that carriers or customers could select the best 
mode based on the operational circumstances and/or customer requirements 
independently at any time. Appropriate application of such concept in practice would 
greatly improve the resilience of container transport chain and ensure the on-time 
delivery of cargoes even under disruptive events. Di Francesco et al. (2013) addressed 
the empty container repositioning problem in a shipping network subject to port 
disruptions. They adopted a stochastic programming approach to mitigate the risks of 
not meeting empty container demand. 
 
8. Conclusions 
This paper treats the whole value chain of the container shipping industry into five segments, 
e.g. shipment routing and capacity procurement, container fleet and repositioning, vessel fleet 
and operations, terminal operations and container handling, and inland transport vehicle and 
container handling. A wide range of strategic planning, tactical planning and operations 
management issues are identified across the entire value chain. We have reviewed the 
relevant literature on each of the identified issues and also suggested future research 
opportunities bearing in mind the emerging phenomena in the current shipping practice. The 
strategic planning issues studied include competition and cooperation between carriers, ports, 
and terminals; and pricing and contracting. The tactical planning issues covered in this paper 
include network design and routing, ship scheduling and slow steaming. The operations 
management issues include empty container repositioning, safety and disruption management. 
Representative models are introduced to address some of the problems in each of the above 
areas. For example, we presented two models of slow steaming reflecting different 
perspectives. One of these models can explain why ocean carriers are still widely adopting 
slow steaming although the bunker fuel price has dropped below the tipping point. This 
complements the claims made in the literature (Cariou 2011; Brett 2015) that slow steaming 
might become unsustainable to the container shipping industry when the fuel price is lower 
than US$350 per ton.   
 
Some areas have been well studied yet remain challenging and important, including for 
example, service network design (how to solve an integrated model) and empty container 
repositioning (how to estimate the real repositioning cost). Some areas are understudied in 
ocean transport applications, including for example, contracting and pricing, disruption 
management, and information sharing (Zhang et al, 2016), although contracting and 
information sharing have been well studied in the field of manufacturing supply chains.  
 
It is hoped that this study will stimulate more research into and application of operations 
management techniques and tools in container transport chains. For example, it is well known 
that big data and business analytics have been applied in airline industry to study customer 
preference. Hence revenue management and dynamic pricing have been widely used to 
setting flight ticket price. However, given that the cost of ocean container transport is 
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relatively low (as a fraction of the product shelf price), it is an open question whether it is 
worth committing the effort and investment to apply big data techniques in ocean container 
transport. In short term, the cost of the collection and storage of data may be greater than the 
benefit obtained. Nevertheless, given the exponential progress in information technologies 
and fast dropping of the corresponding cost, the answer may soon become positive. 
Furthermore, it is a trend that government keeps tighter security policy, including for 
example, 100% scan rate policy proposed by US Government in 2010 (though it was not 
really implemented due to the cost issue and the strong against from Asia and Europe (Bakshi 
et al. 2011)) as well as the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) required by the 
International Maritime Organization, to be legally effective on July 1, 2016.  It would be 
interesting to examine whether advanced IT tools, especially big data, can be applied in ocean 
transport business as well as help to fulfill the security policy. 
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